Evolution of Bilateral Capital Flows to Developing Countries at Intensive and Extensive Margins by Araujo, J. et al.
 UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge Working 
Papers in Economics 
 
Evolution of Bilateral Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries at Intensive and 
Extensive Margins 
 
 
 Juliana Araujo, Povilas Lastauskas and 
Chris Papageorgiou 
CWPE 1502 
Evolution of Bilateral Capital Flows to Developing Countries at
Intensive and Extensive Margins∗
Juliana Araujo†
International Monetary Fund
Povilas Lastauskas‡
University of Cambridge
Chris Papageorgiou§
International Monetary Fund
February 7, 2015
Abstract
The capital flows network has changed substantially, bringing new investors and target economies into play. Related,
a recent intensification of capital flows to low income countries (LICs) has posed a number of questions. Most
importantly, the very nature of those flows and important factors affecting foreign investors decision which can
ultimately affect growth prospects of low income countries (together with an issue of sustainability) remain open for
an academic probe. Due to an existence of a share of costs which is fixed in nature, there is a need to analyze capital
flows and their evolution at two margins: intensive and extensive. This paper presents a parsimonious theoretical
account that is consequently mapped into an econometric framework where we allow for two-tier decisions and cross-
sectional dependence. Results indicate that market entry costs affect investment decisions pertinent to the LICs,
consistently with the static theory. However, persistence in extensive margin eliminates this effect once dynamics
is allowed for.
Keywords: Bilateral Capital Flows, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Flows, Developing Economies,
Extensive and Intensive Margins, Heterogeneous Panels, Cross-Sectional Dependence, Copulae.
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1 Introduction
Despite capital being one of major manifestations of globalization and development engines, we lack
understanding on what determines capital flows to low income countries. In this paper we consider two
main types of private long-term capital movements, namely portfolio1 and direct investment, though
emphasize the latter.2 The major difference between the two types is that direct investor has, on a lasting
basis, management interest in a nonresident enterprise, whilst portfolio investment is purely financial in
nature.3 The stage of development of a country also influences the investors’ decisions. All these issues
∗We thank, without implication, Craig Burnside, Alexis Cerkel Meyer, Era Dabla-Norris, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti,
Catherine Pattillo, Peter Pedroni, M. Hashem Pesaran, Laurynas Tribaldovas, and Eric van Wincoop for their helpful advice
and/or discussions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
IMF.
†Address: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431, USA. Email: jaraujo@imf.org.
‡Corresponding author. Address: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3
9DD, UK. Email: pl312@cam.ac.uk.
§Address: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431, USA. Email: cpapageorgiou@imf.org.
1 For example, holdings of government securities and private equities, with the latter significantly more important than
the former, preference shares, equities without control over organization, bonds issued by international organizations, etc.
2 Other types include international loans and commercial credits with a maturity of more than one year.
3 Portfolio investment is traditionally considered to be a function of differential yields and risk diversification. Usually
the set of efficient portfolios is first determined, independently of the stock of wealth, and later the optimum portfolio is
determined employing the investor’s utility function. Evidently, the yields, risks and tastes (and the stock of wealth itself),
underlying the optimum composition, must be time-variant for the continuous flows of portfolio investment to take place.
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require adequate theoretical and empirical accounts, paying attention to fixed costs, generating two-tier
decisions, and flexible structure between them.
Moreover, the foreign direct investment deserves discussion with respect to real and financial aspects
of investment. One way to analyze the FDI is to consider movements of the productive factor (real capital)
between countries. The trade theory is then fully compatible: the causes of capital flows include different
rewards in different economies due to prices, taxes and tariffs4 and other reasons like specialization or
factor-intensity reversals. Industry-specific and real economy factors shall be considered because usually
big corporations with a high product differentiation engage in FDI.5 The potential advantages include the
transfer of entrepreneurship and new technology, whereas disadvantages assume outflows of repatriated
profits, diminution in sovereignty, and economic policy inefficacies.6 Razin and Sadka (2007a) carefully
differentiate between the two, FDI and FPI, flows. FDI firms are more efficient at the expense of initial
fixed cost and higher selling cost (lower liquidity), whereas others whose probability of a liquidity shock
is higher choose FPI. Razin and Sadka (2007a) stress two margins of FDI decisions, driven by fixed setup
costs. Maintaining wages fixed in the host country, a positive productivity shock in this country increases
the marginal products of the factors of production (including capital). Hence, a positive effect on the
flows of FDI that are governed by the intensive margin. However, when wages are allowed to adjust,
the productivity shock generates an upward pressure on wages which raises the fixed setup costs and
discourages FDI through the extensive margin.
We model FDI flows drawing from these insights in the unifying framework of a gravity model making
use of bilateral (rather than aggregate) capital flows data. Our contribution revolves around three parts.
First, a single parsimonious framework for both, FDI and portfolio, types of capital flows resulting in
simple gravity-type relations is presented. Second, our framework enables us to analyze the changing
structure of international investment along two, intensive and extensive, margins. Our simplifying as-
sumption of separability allows telling supply story for FDI and demand story for portfolio investment,
also admits a simple mapping from theory to empirics. Unlike, for example, Razin and Sadka (2007b,a)
which develop a more dynamic approach for FDI by using current value functions for firms to determine
whether an investment is worthwhile to take place. However, that approach results in a reduced form es-
timation, with less parsimony, weaker links between theory and empirics, and different emphasis (authors
mainly rely on OECD countries with the longer time dimension). Third, by decomposing the sample into
least developed countries and middle income economies, we are able to track differences across develop-
ment stages. We offer new perspectives for direct and portfolio capital flows, and countries just starting
to be actors in capital markets. Our parsimonious econometric framework allows for cross sectional de-
pendencies, directional fixed and time effects, also can be cast in copula setting to avoid distributional
assumptions. Before we turn to analyzing the changing nature of capital flows to LICs and the economic
determinants of investors’ decision, we first review the gravity framework and its applications to capital
movements.
The paper is organized as follows. We overview theoretical and empirical contributions to FDI and
portfolio literatures in Section 2. Section 3 depicts a number of recent stylized facts on developing
countries, push and pull factors, intensive and extensive margins, and evolution of capital flows network.
A theoretical model is laid down in Section 4. We discuss econometric setting in Section 5 and overview
baseline results in Section 6. Extensions and robustness checks are undertaken in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 concludes and outlines future research directions and policy implications whereas Appendix
collects all the supporting material.
4 Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be invoked to determine a relationship between tariffs and factor rewards. As emphasized
by Gandolfo (2002), the effects on the host country can be analyzed drawing from the Rybczynski’s theorem because it
addresses the effects of changes in factor endowment (capital stock).
5 See Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), for a formalization of heterogeneous multinationals engaging in production
abroad as opposed to trade.
6 Examples of a loss of sovereignty include instructions from the parent company which need to be followed instead of
those from local authorities whereas monetary policy can become ineffective due to the resources to the financial market of
the parent company.
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2 Brief Literature Review
Though literature on capital flows is vast, contributions on the links between theory and empirics are
scarce. We overview the use of gravity framework to model both FDI and portfolio flows. Empirical
literature has focused on advanced economies and developing countries (see Levy Yeyati, Stein, and Daude
(2003) among others) but with little if at all work trying to distinguish between developed countries at
different stages of development. Though theory is pointing to capital markets efficiency and integration,
also institutional quality to attract investment, we lack knowledge on factors which generate success
or failure to be a target economy for international investors. Before dealing with specificities of low
and middle income countries, we cover main theoretical and empirical determinants to engage in foreign
investment as entertained by current literature.
2.1 Gravity in Direct Investment Flows
Foreign Direcet Investment (FDI) is usually modeled as an investment made by the multinational firms.
The gravity-type dependence for the foreign affiliates’ sales was derived by Kleinert and Toubal (2010).
They employ three different models: the emergence of horizontal multinational firms with firm symmetry
and heterogeneity, and the emergence of vertical multinational firms using a factor-proportions approach.
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) assume that that fixed costs increase with distance, thereby leading to a
negative relationship between distance and affiliate sales (the standard proximity - concentration model
predicts an opposite result). The factor proportions model augments the otherwise standard gravity
specification with a relative factor endowment and a joint size of home and host country regressor.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) also argued that transportation costs may be relevant not only for com-
modity trade but also for international asset transactions. Mody (2007) collects research on what attracts
and what discourages investment in a foreign country. Distances, especially informational and transac-
tional do play a role as does “herding” behavior believed to be rooted in informational advantages of
previous investors into the country. Another line of inquiry is concerned with benefits of FDI. It is found
that FDI is not integrating the world in the sense that it flows to places where conditions are already
propitious. Interestingly, Mody and Murshid (2005) find that developing countries with better policies
succeeded more in absorbing foreign inflows by creating an environment conducive for the diffusion of
new technologies and ideas intrinsic to foreign capital. Improved policies probably also reduced the risk
of holding domestic assets, which in turn, by discouraging capital outflows, would have further enhanced
the relationship between capital flows and domestic investment.
Razin and Sadka (2007c) focus on bilateral FDI flows among OECD countries. An important feature of
the FDI model (which distinguishes FDI flows from portfolio flows) is fixed setup costs of new investments.
This introduces two margins of FDI decisions. There is an intensive margin of determining the magnitude
of the flows of FDI, according to standard marginal productivity conditions, and also an extensive margin
of determining whether to make a new investment. The first decision gives rise to a flow equation, whereas
the second decision produces a selection-condition equation. Crucially, productivity and taxes may affect
these two margins in different, possibly conflicting, ways. Yet, unlike our inquiry, Razin and Sadka (2007c)
concentrate on FDI flows only and differ in econometric treatment as well as theory.
2.2 Gravity in Portfolio Flows
There have been numerous applications of gravity specification in analyzing capital flows. Yet, theoretical
foundations are scarce. Martin and Rey (2004) derive a gravity equation for financial holdings when
countries trade claims on Arrow Debreu securities. Agents are endowed with a freely traded good, which
they can choose to consume, invest in fixed-size risky projects or use to buy shares on the stock market.
Investing in a specific project is equivalent to buying an Arrow-Debreu asset that pays in only one
state of nature. With endogenously incomplete asset markets economic size becomes important to the
determination of asset returns, the breadth of financial markets and the degree of risk sharing and home
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bias. Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) analyze trade in bonds, equity and banking assets. The financial
version of the gravity equation for the holdings of assets includes a size factor (GDP, the number of
assets in source country which relates to economic size (GDP and market capitalization) and the financial
sophistication, transaction costs between the two countries, expected returns and the financial price index
which is specific to each country. However, these approaches are limited to cases which satisfy Arrow
Debreu conditions: when the asset of a country has a positive payoff, the assets of all other countries have
a zero payoff.
To avoid this limitation, Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) have recently contributed to the literature
on financial flows gravity. The foundations of the model lie in a static portfolio choice framework where
investors hold claims on risky assets from a large number of countries. Asset returns are affected both by a
country-specific and a global component. Bilateral financial holdings depend on the product of economic
size variables (stock market capitalization in the destination country and total investment in stock in
the source country) divided by a relative financial friction. The gravity specification for bilateral asset
holdings includes the equity supply, equity holdings, World’s demand and supply of equity, information
frictions, multilateral resistance terms which measure the average financial frictions for a destination and
source country.7
3 Recent Facts
This section briefly overviews some interesting stylized facts on capital flows in developing economies over
the last two decades by analyzing aggregate and bilateral flows data. It also reviews some of the factors
related to private capital flows commonly discussed in the literature.
3.1 Trends in Developing Countries
As shown in Figure 3.1 that describes the evolution of capital flows in low– and middle–income countries,
the Financial Crisis has affected both groups considerably. Interestingly, LICs have started to receive
substantial amount of capital only very recently (see the size difference in the right scale). The only
period of intensified portfolio investments into LICs are a boom period before and, to some extent, after
the financial crisis. Even FDI is a very recent phenomenon with a clear upward trend for LICs for a less
than a decade.
7 As a limitation, Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) demonstrate that gravity cannot be sustained once one allows for a
general covariance structure of asset returns, while assuming that factors generating return co-movement cannot be separately
hedged, also for taxes on foreign returns, and trade in only risky assets.
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Fig. 3.1: Portfolio Investment in LICs and MICs (right scale: LICs) and FDI in LICs and MICs (right
scale: LICs)
Data: IMF, World Economy Outlook
Though FDI is dominating (see Figure 3.2), portfolio flows, as mentioned, are to be taking some
acceleration in recent years too. Due to requirements on some financial development, portfolio flows are
more important for a few selected economies rather than are as widely spread out as FDI. Moreover,
Figure 3.2 confirms the idea of FDI being relatively stable, most probably because of large fixed costs
and thus lower liquidity, as compared to the portfolio flows whose variation on both positive and negative
sides is substantial.
Fig. 3.2: Composition of Capital Flows for LICs
Data: IMF, World Economy Outlook
3.2 Intensive and Extensive Margins
In order to further understand the recent development in capital flows in developing countries, we de-
compose bilateral flows data on extensive and intensive margins. We draw from Felbermayr and Kohler
(2006) which distinguishes between changes in the number of active bilateral trade relationships (extensive
margin), and the growth of trade volumes in existing relationships (intensive margin). In our context,
if attraction in some cases is not strong enough to generate investment at all, then ignoring such cases
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altogether implies that we systematically overestimate the force of attraction, or - equivalently - under-
estimate the investment-inhibiting force of spatial frictions. Push and pull factors are accounted for by
bilateral gravity model with both intensive and extensive margins. The latter allows modeling newly
established links, especially among newly emerged markets.
We use a similar approach for the capital flows analysis. There are a few reasons to concentrate
on these two margins rather than the aggregate capital flow. At first, investigation of the extensive
margin relates directly to diversification issues and welfare. If flows are based on portfolio diversification,
then expansion of world financial movements on the extensive margin seems particularly important from a
welfare perspective, since it increases the degree of diversification. Hence, we aim at consistently capturing
simultaneous movements on both margins through time.
Moreover, there are many zero capital flows, especially to developing countries. Then, fixed costs
generate decisions at two margins, i.e., the direction and volume. It also helps establishing the path-
dependency observed in investors’ behavior (see Welch (1992) for the example with the initial public
offering shares and references to many other applications). Further, fixed cost allows addressing the
emergence of new destinations for investments once the structure of those costs in the country changes
relative to the global system.
Our analysis makes it possible to track which factors are responsible for each of the margins, explore
the relative importance of both margins over time, and compare the portfolio and direct investment at
each of the margins. Moreover, we can do so for countries at different development stages.
To formalize, let us defineNt, h to denote the number of capital links of vintage h that are active at time
t. The vintage of a capital link is defined as the earliest time at which capital movements occur between
a specific pair of two countries, based on their financial openness. A country is said to be financially open
if it receives capital from at least one foreign country. Total capital flow can therefore be written as
Mt =
t∑
h=t0
M¯t, hNt, h,
where M¯t, h is the average bilateral capital flow based on active links of vintage h. Further, let M¯t be
the average volume of capital flows at time t across all vintages, M¯t =
∑t
h=t0 M¯t, h/
∑t
h=t0 Nt, h. Let’s
start with a change in capital flows on the intensive margin which is defined as the movements in capital
volumes over the existing relationships (links):
4M intt =
t−1∑
h=t0
(
M¯t, h − M¯t−1, h
)
Nt−1, h =
t−1∑
h=t0
4M¯t, hNt−1, h,
whereas the changes in the number of active links are defined as
4Nt =
t−1∑
h=t0
(Nt, h −Nt−1, h) =
t−1∑
h=t0
4Nt, h.
One can easily check that a change in capital flows is defined as the sum of changes on intensive and
extensive margins, 4Mt = 4M intt +4NtM¯t,8
4Mt ≡ 4M¯tNt−1 +4NtM¯t
=
(
M¯t − M¯t−1
)
Nt−1 + (Nt −Nt−1) M¯t = NtM¯t − M¯t−1Nt−1.
Therefore, changes on the extensive margin are “weighted” by end-of-period average flow volumes, while
changes on the intensive margin are “weighted” by beginning-of-period numbers of links. Our temporal
dimension is short, therefore, results are not to be significantly affected by time weights.
8 Notice that 4M intt =
∑t−1
h=t0
4M¯t, hNt−1, h = 4
(∑t
h=t0
M¯t, h/
∑t
h=t0
Nt, h
)∑t−1
h=t0
Nt−1, h = 4M¯tNt−1.
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Fig. 3.3: Cumulative Difference of Total, Intensive and Extensive Margins of FDI flows for All Developing,
Middle–Income and Low–Income Countries from 2002 to 2010
In Figure 3.3 we plot the changes in capital flows over time period 2003-2010 and their decomposition
of the intensive and extensive margins. The graph helps exploring changes in domination of the respective
margins in good times and over economic crisis along the cross-sectional and the time-series dimension of
the data.
The variability of both intensive and extensive margins is substantial for the developing countries.
Usually the adjustment takes place at the intensive margin because extensive margin requires reinitiating
of the link after it has been broken which may be costly. Indeed, the positive capital flow between two
countries arises only if their bilateral asset trade and investment potential exceeds some source-destination
economy specific threshold value. Maintaining flow relationships requires certain infrastructure and in-
stitutions that facilitate an efficient flow of information and exchange of ideas, in addition to the best-
practice banking system. Some relevant institutions are international payment systems, legal agreements,
consulates, or the activities of the respective chambers of commerce. Individual firms will not be able to
invest in the absence of services provided by such institutions. Rational governments will invest into these
institutions only if the expected benefit from a materializing capital flow potential in present value terms
exceeds the investment cost. Therefore, capital inflow will only materialize if its full potential exceeds the
threshold level, otherwise bilateral flow will be zero.
3.3 Expanding Network of Capital Flows
We also analyze the changes in capital flows network. Figure 3.4 demonstrates how capital flows flew
from advanced to developing countries in 2002 and 2010. In less than ten years, the network became way
denser, with more investors, new receivers and more connections. This calls for further study of capital
flow dynamics, in particular, to understand when the link is established and how much is being invested
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Fig. 3.4: Network Structure of Capital Flows to LICs in 2002 and 2010
Tab. 3.1: Aggregate Statistics of the Network of Capital Flows in 2002 and 2010 for LICs and MICs
Average Weighted Core
Degree Average Degree Membership
LIC 2002 7.335 21.736 Netherlands, Nigeria, United States
LIC 2010 9.819 103.046 Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway
MIC 2002 95.105 602.331 Mexico, United States
MIC 2010 30.597 2600.767 Brazil, China, India, Japan, Luxembourg,Switzerland, United States
Average Degree refers to the sum of edges of a vertex. Weighted Average Degree is the average of sum of weights of the edges of nodes.
once it is in place. The cross-sectional dependence is also confirmed by a number of statistical tests.9
Table 3.1 collects information on aggregate statistics of capital network for both, LICs and MICs.
Notice it is exactly for LICs that the average degree has increased - hence, the extensive margin played
the most prominent role (the number of links attached to an economy increased). However, both extensive
and intensive margins are taken into account once we compute the weighted average degree where the
weights (volumes of capital flows) are considered. It is then clear that both LICs and MICs experienced
substantial increases in capital flows, with a few economies receiving very large flows. Also, the core
members have increased in number and changed identity. The emerging markets - such as Brazil, India
and China (BIC) - emerged as core members in 2010 as compared to 2002.
3.4 Explanatory Factors
We now turn attention to factors which are particularly relevant for LICs. Our interest in the topic has
been sparked by a steep rise in private capital flows to the emerging and developing countries in the middle
of the past decade. Although such flows briefly reversed during the apex of the crisis, very low interest
rates in advanced countries and an attenuation of global risk aversion have once again prompted investors
to scour the globe in search of attractive investment opportunities. The private flows are increasingly the
main source of external financing for many countries in the developing world. Moreover, private flows
tend to be more volatile in low income countries.
9 Available upon request.
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Generally, factors affecting the capital flows can be grouped into global and local factors that influence
the supply of funds (for example, including the relative return between the source country and the
recipient) and factors that determine the demand for funds. Local economic environment in general
and country-specific pull factors in particular are important determinants of the pattern of flows across
developing regions. Equity investors are mainly attracted by locations which can offer high, long-term
returns and low correlations with other markets.
Among developing countries, the so-called frontier markets10 managed to attract relatively more cap-
ital than other locations. Frontier market short- and medium-term securities typically have higher yields
than in more developed emerging countries. Output growth, which supports returns on equity portfolio
and foreign direct investment (FDI), has usually been higher in the frontier markets (FMs) than in other
regions during the last few years. Another important factor for FDI inflows is an interest in resource
extraction activities, also a diversification of the export base. For example, Sub-Saharan African FMs
show the fastest average diversification improvements between 1996 and 2009, and they also attract more
capital than non-frontier markets, see IMF (2011).11 Sectors play a significant part in attracting foreign
investment: for instance, Angola has experienced unusually large foreign direct investment into its oil
extraction industry, peaking at 40 percent of GDP in 2000, IMF (2011). Another example of Mauritius
makes a case for a financial platform for investors bound for Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. With a strong
regulatory framework in line with international norms and a resilient economy, Mauritius has benefited
from favorable investor sentiment, despite lower domestic interest rates. This points to the existence of
investments “hubs” among developing countries, too.
As demonstrated by IMF (2011), developing financial markets and integrating them with global mar-
kets, and implementing policies that provide a supportive macroeconomic and institutional environment
are crucial for capital inflows that can support investment and growth. Yet, all these factors show no
structure, channels and investment margins that are affected. We will seek a transparent, parsimonious
and more structural approach to major determinants. Though not all determinants can be explicitly
modeled or controlled for, the empirical exercise must be flexible to allow for country-level and global
factors.
Nonetheless, figure 3.5 demonstrates unconditional within variation of log FDI flows deviations from
individual means against log of destination income deviations from individual means. There is a clear
upward trend, thereby indicating of gravity forces - destination and source incomes being positively
associated with FDI - at work.
10 The term “frontier markets” (FMs) is commonly used to describe a subset of emerging markets (EMs) that have small
financial sectors and/or have low annual turnover and liquidity, but nonetheless demonstrate a relative openness to and
accessibility for foreign investors. They are generally in the early stages of financial market development. See IMF (2011).
11 Hence, capital flows are related to trade flows. This diversification offers new opportunities for investors and also requires
more capital due to underdevelopment but also potentially offers higher returns to investment. This points to the location
and spatial considerations.
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Fig. 3.5: Bilateral FDI vs Destination and Source Incomes in Overall Sample
Having documented some important changes in the nature of capital flows in developing economies and
especially in LICs, We turn to discussing the modeling strategy which must account for the two margins
(intensive and extensive) whose dynamics seem crucial to understanding current and future developments
of capital flow changes.
4 Theoretical Motivation
Our theoretical setup incorporates decisions to consume, also portfolio investment, and production choices,
including investing abroad. Within the same framework, we introduce the FDI flows which require several
changes as the driving forces are presumably different compared to portfolio investment. Mainly FDI
are flows within multinationals or large companies whose motives can also be described by the gravity
equation. For the direct investment, we mainly follow Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and,
instead of trade flows, adapt it to the capital flows.12 As an extension, we also consider portfolio flows,
for which we mainly draw from Okawa and van Wincoop (2012). To produce such a framework, we
need to consider both, consumption and production sides of the economy.13 The simplifying assumption
will be separability of total expenditure into (portfolio) investment and goods produced by firms located
in different markets (FDI). Firms will be deciding on FDI whereas the residual income will be invested
to diversify portfolio by the agents. It is a multi-country setting featuring N countries indexed by i =
0, . . . , N. Unlike standard models with labor as the only factor (for example, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2008), among others) we
assume two factors of production, labor l and capital k. Country i is endowed with Li and Ki aggregate
units of inelastically supplied labor and capital, respectively.
Consider a simple two-period problem of agents in country i to choose aggregate consumption (Qi),
aggregate investment (Ii) and the allocation of consumption and investment goods across N countries
(respectively, qin and iin for all n) to maximize the present discounted value of lifetime utility
maxUi ≡ max{Qi, Ii, ii, qi}≥0
∑T
t=0 (1 + ρ)
−t U (Qit) ,
subject to
PitQit + P IitIit = Eit,
12 A related piece of work is due to Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) which has been a simplified version of firm selection
with more symmetry than in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). Similarly, heterogenous firm framework has been
utilized by Kleinert and Toubal (2010) which derive gravity relationship from the three different models of multinational
firms.
13 As was done in Yotov and Olivero (2012) to model dynamic conditional gravity.
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where P refers to aggregate price index for goods and P I stands for the aggregate price for all country i
equity claims. Time is discrete and, in principle, T can be infinite, though we limit our analysis to the
most trivial dynamics (mainly to reflect a very limited time dimension in empirical exercise). The residual
income will be denoted as E˜it ≡ Eit−P IitIit to refer to the income after the portfolio investment has been
subtracted and therefore can be used for consumption, and, similarly, Eit ≡ Eit − PitQit. Further, the
consumption and investment goods are aggregated by the CES aggregators, i.e.,
Iit =
(ˆ
ω∈Ωi
iit (ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
.
Hence, the lifetime utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint which accounts for spending on
both consumption and investment goods across all countries. The production function of the representa-
tive firm in country i producing a brand ω is assumed to be,
yit (ω) =
kαiit l
1−αi
it
ϕ
,
where yit (ω) summarizes output of variety ω, lit (ω) is labor used in its production, kit (ω) is capital used
in its production, αi ∈ (0, 1) denotes the factor intensity of production in country i and ϕ is a firm’s from
country i’s idiosyncratic productivity innovation drawn from the known distribution G (ϕ). A firm uses
k units of capital and l units of labor in variable production.14 Then the maximizing choice ki, t (ω) is
characterized by the first order condition with respect to aggregate consumption,
U ′i (Qit) = 11+ρU ′i (Qi, t+1) .
To simplify our analysis, we choose iso-elastic utility function which helps obtaining closed-form solu-
tions for portfolio allocations, also makes consumption and investment decisions independent of each
other.15 Recall that for constant relative risk aversion utility the investment decision is independent of
the consumption decision (Samuelson, 1969 and Merton, 1969). Therefore, agents will be deciding on
consumption and portfolio investment separately whereas heterogeneous firms will be deciding on domes-
tic production, exporting and direct investment. We turn to firm choices first, and, for convenience, omit
time subscript when it is not essential.
4.1 Firms Decisions
A firm with productivity ϕ from country i incurs a cost
Cin (q) = vi (qτinϕ+ fin)
to supply q > 0 units of goods to country n where fin stands for fixed costs to enter n’s market. We refer
to vi as the cost of the composite input bundle in country i,
vi (ω) =
rαii w
1−αi
i
ααii (1− αi)1−αi
,
14 We abstract from total factor productivity and its stochastic implications - the extension undertaken by Lastauskas and
Pesaran (2013) in the gravity modeling with growing economies and global perspective.
15 Isoelastic functions exhibit constant elasticities. A class of such functions is known as monomials, loosely understood as
polynomials with only one term. The functional form is not operational for FDI but is important for demand driven portfolio
flows, as covered in Appendix A.2.
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where wi and ri are country i’s payments for labor and capital, respectively.16 The marginal costs are
cin (ϕ) ≡ dCin (q)
dq
= viτinϕ.
Profit maximization implies that a firm charges a constant markup over its marginal cost, pin (ϕ) =
σ
σ−1cin (ϕ). In this case, a firm’s market-specific revenue is proportional to its marginal cost,
Rin (ϕ) =
QnPn
Pn1−σ
(
σ
σ − 1cin (ϕ)
)1−σ
= E˜n
(
pin (ϕ)
Pn
)1−σ
, (4.1)
and its market-specific variable profit is proportional to its revenue piin (ϕ) = Rin (ϕ) /σ. We denote
expenditure on varieties as the residual expenditure, E˜nt ≡ Eit − P IitIit. With Cobb-Douglas production
functions, payments to labor and capital can be expressed as functions of revenue,
wilin (ϕ) = σ−1σ (1− αi)Rin (ϕ) ,
rikin (ϕ) = σ−1σ αiRin (ϕ) .
Firms engage in monopolistic competition. Because of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, monopolists charge
a constant markup over marginal cost. Moreover, under monopolistic competition, zero economic profits
in equilibrium ensures constant output of each firm. The utility maximization subject to E˜i =
∑
nMin
yields
Min =
(
piτin
Pn
)−σ
E˜n (4.2)
since income is equal to expenditure in equilibrium. Firms take the residual demand in (4.2) as given and
maximize profits by choosing a price. In any country n, the price of a variety ω from country i is given
by
pin (ω) = σσ−1τinviϕ
= τinpi (ω)
for all ω ∈ Ωin. (4.3)
Note that pin is the cost-insurance-freight (C.I.F.) price in country n as it depends on trade costs τin
which could be interpreted as ‘iceberg costs’. Hence, for unit to arrive, τin more product shall be sent as
this share ‘melts’ on the way. It is clear now that pi is the free on board (F.O.B.) price locally at exporter.
It is a stylized fact that only a part of firms actually trade, see Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). In
our setup product and firm partitioning is fully determined by the productivity space since productivities
map one-to-one to varieties. Therefore, we consider a measure of firms in country i which supply market
n. This happens if the variable profit a firm earns there covers its fixed market access cost, Rin (ϕ) /σ ≥
vif
EXP
in . Denote by ϕEXPin the productivity threshold at which the least productive firm from country i
sells in country n (
ϕEXPin τin
)1−σ
E˜n
σσ(σ−1)1−σP 1−σn = v
σ
i f
EXP
in ,
whereas the productivity to invest in country n is defined as(
ϕFDIin
)1−σ
E˜n
σσ(σ−1)1−σP 1−σn = v
σ
nf
FDI
in ,
noting that no iceberg cost is paid when a firm choose FDI over export and production costs are priced
in destination country.17 To enter, a firm incurs a fixed entry cost of fe > 0 units of the composite
16 We abstract from modelling exchange rate dynamics both theoretically and empirically, mainly because of the data for
our targeted, developing, countries. It should be said, however, that Gourinchas and Rey (2007) emphasize that global
imbalances and external imbalances (NXA) adjusted via the trade and the valuation channels. Hence, NXA is a linear
combination of exports/imports and net foreign asset position. Corte, Sarno, and Sestieri (2012) find a strong predictive
power for US dollar rates as well as other numeraire currencies for NXA on a bilateral basis across four major countries.
17 Note that the condition for ordering of the cutoffs between FDI and exporting is as follows: ϕFDIin < ϕEXPin leading
to ϕEXPin = 1τin
[
vσi f
EXP
in σ
σ(σ−1)1−σP1−σn
E˜n
]1/(1−σ)
and ϕFDIin =
[
vσnf
FDI
in σ
σ(σ−1)1−σP1−σn
E˜n
]1/(1−σ)
. Therefore, the requirement
is equivalent to τσ−1in fEXPin <
(
vn
vi
)σ
fFDIin , where the outcome is determined by relative sizes of fixed costs, transportation
costs, and relative costs of capital and labor as embodied in v.
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input bundle vi, making startup costs in country i to be equal to fevi. Upon entry, firms draw their
productivity ϕ from the same distribution G (ϕ), assumed to be truncated Pareto.18 It is defined as
G (ϕ) = ϕ
k−ϕkL
ϕkH−ϕkL
, k > σ − 1. This framework allows for asymmetric capital flows, Mni 6= Min, which may
also be unidirectional, with Mni > 0 and Min = 0, or Mni = 0 and Min > 0.19 In this setup, the total
direct investment from country i to country n is
MFDIin =
´ ϕFDIin
ϕL
pFDIin (ω)
1−σ E˜nPnσ−1NidG (ϕ) = E˜nPnσ−1Ni
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
v1−σn
´ ϕFDIin
ϕL
ϕ1−σdG (ϕ)
= E˜nPnσ−1Ni
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
v1−σn
k(ϕL)k−σ+1
(ϕkH−ϕkL)(k−σ+1)
[(
ϕFDIin
ϕL
)k−σ+1
− 1
]
= E˜nPnσ−1Ni
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
v1−σn V FDIin ,
(4.4)
where Ni is the mass of entering firms which is an endogenous object. Let selection be subsumed within
V FDIin =
k (ϕL)k−σ+1(
ϕkH − ϕkL
)
(k − σ + 1)
[(
ϕFDIin /ϕL
)k−σ+1 − 1] , (4.5)
then the price index with firms investing abroad is defined as
P 1−σi =
∑N
n=0Nn
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
v1−σn
´ ϕin
ϕL
ϕ1−σdG (ϕ)
=
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1∑N
n=0 v
1−σ
n NnV
FDI
in .
(4.6)
Finally, full employment of production factors is obtained whenever∑N
n=1
∑
j wilin (ϕ) =
∑
j
(
(1− αi) σ−1σ
∑N
n=1Rin (ϕ) +Kivife
)
,∑N
n=1
∑
j rikin (ϕ) =
∑
j
(
αi
σ−1
σ
∑N
n=1Rin (ϕ) +Kivife
)
.
In the endogenous entry case, the free entry condition implies that total profits are equal to zero, which
leads to E˜i = QiPi = wiLi + riKi (also constant returns to scale technology if factors are paid their
marginal products). Using the result on the number of entering firms and gravity equation
∑N
n=1M
FDI
in = E˜i = Ki
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ∑N
n=1 E˜nPn
σ−1v1−σn V FDIin ,
and substituting for Ki we obtain
MFDIin =
E˜iE˜nP
σ−1
n v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in∑N
n=1 E˜nP
σ−1
n v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in
= E˜iE˜n∑N
n=1 E˜nV
FDI
in (vn/Pn)
1−σ
(
vn
Pn
)1−σ
V FDIin
= v1−σn V FDIin E˜iE˜n[PnΠi]1−σ ,
(4.7)
18 As evidenced by Aoyama, Fujiwara, and Ikeda (2010), a number of phenomena obey the power-law distribution. It
is shown that income and net profit of large Japanese companies follow Pareto law. Moreover, despite the choice of unit,
i.e., flows or stocks, Pareto distribution is obtained in both cases for European data. Total capital and sales of French
companies and the number of employees of British companies all fit into Pareto framework. Axtell (2001) also finds that
Pareto reasonably approximates the observed distribution of firm sizes in the USA for data from multiple years and for
various definitions of firm size. As a caveat, however, we note that power laws are less successful in dealing with the smaller
establishments, also with predicting a number of links for the most central firms in the network and firms with low in-degrees.
See Atalay, Hortacsu, Roberts, and Syverson (2011).
19 Following Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), we can introduce a latent variable, ZFDIin ≡
(
ϕFDIin
ϕL
)σ−1
which can
also be rewritten as ZFDIin = (σ−1)
σ−1
σσ
E˜n
(
cin(ϕL)
Pn
)1−σ
/vnf
FDI
in , which is the ratio of variable profits for the most productive
firm to the fixed costs for exports from i to n. Positive multinational sales are observed if and only if ZFDIin > 1. Moreover,
scaling zin ≡ lnZFDIin by the standard deviation ση, we obtain the probability ρji that i decides invest to j, conditional on
the observed variables, ρni = Pr (z?ni > 0 | observed variables) .
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where the traditional multilateral resistance terms are included in the gravity,
Π1−σi =
N∑
n=1
E˜nV
FDI
in (vn/Pn)1−σ , (4.8)
and price index in (4.6) leads to an expression similar to that in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The
difference of the gravity equation as compared to the traditional expression includes the destination cost
term vn which is an aggregator of the labour costs and capital rental rate. The term V FDIin captures the
probability of entering into n’s economy and the extensive margin of capital network. Due to separability,
E˜ denotes the residual expenditure after the portfolio investments have been subtracted. It is then clear
that the flow of capital decreases, ceteris paribus, in destination’s wages and cost of capital (recall that
σ > 1), increases in own and destination expenditures, and increases in the multilateral resistance terms
which capture all the weighted costs to invest in all other economies.
There are few ways of dealing with PnΠi, the (directional) fixed effects being the most common
approach, see Feenstra (2004). Another method is to approximate resistance terms around the center of
a free trade world allowing inward and outward terms to be unequal in magnitude. Koch and LeSage
(2009) proceed along these lines and allow for errors due to linearization and interdependence between the
multilateral resistance indices to be captured by latent unobservable terms consistent with the implicit
forms that arise from theory. They translate the global interdependence structure into a Bayesian and
produce estimates of the latent unobservable multilateral resistance terms. Behar and Nelson (2009)
use the first-order Taylor expansion around a symmetric center in which all countries trade, following
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). As is demonstrated by Behar and Nelson (2009), the latent variable,
describing whether investment is positive, can be expressed as a function of the multilateral resistance
terms. Therefore, the system-wide dependence is embedded in the first stage of the estimation, too.20
An interested reader is referred to the Appendix A.2 where agents’ decisions are covered in detail. They
are operational for the portfolio flows, and constitute an extension of the benchmark framework. We will
refer to the relevant derivations when cover the empirical results.
5 Empirical Analysis
Extensive margin requires to account for the decision to invest in a location out of many existing possi-
bilities. There are several alternatives to model this decision making. To account for both margins, trade
literature has used probit (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008), logit (Crozet and Koenig, 2010), tobit
(Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006) and Poisson (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2007, Silva and Tenreyro, 2009)
specifications. Though all these models are similar in many ways, they possess some differences. Poisson
specification is best suited for modeling data with heteroskedastic disturbances. Probit works best when
a large number of dependent variable assumes the value of zero. Probit and tobit differ, however, in how
the unobserved flow is translated into the observed one. In the tobit model, we know the value of latent
flow M?in when M?in > 0, while in the probit model we only know if M?in > 0. Since there is more informa-
tion in the tobit model, the estimates should be more efficient.21 Henceforth we will concentrate on two
20 See Footnote 19 for the definition of the latent variable ZFDIin . In our case, ZFDIin =
(σ−1)σ−1
σσ
E˜n(vnϕL)1−σPσ−1n
vnf
FDI
in
=
E˜nE˜iϕ
1−σ
L
σKiv
σ
nf
FDI
in
(PnΠi)σ−1 = (σ−1)
σ−1
σσ
Pσ−1n E˜nϕ
1−σ
L
vσnf
FDI
in
. Note that separation of input cost does not work here, as opposed to Behar
and Nelson (2009), because FDI relies on destination country’s labor hiring and capital rental rates. Econometrically, the
extensive margin in our setting should be driven by destination variables only, i.e., destination prices, destination income,
destination cost of labor and capital, and fixed costs of direct investment.
21 Yet, the suitability of the tobit model is testable by multiplying the probit coefficients by σtobit - this should produce
close estimates of the tobit coefficients. This is because the probit estimates should be consistent for σtobit-adjusted tobit
estimates given tobit is the correct model (Greene, 2003). From technical point of view, the tobit loglikelihood function is
really a probit model combined with a truncated regression model, with the coefficient vectors in the two models restricted
to be proportional to each other. This restriction can be tested by means of an LR test.
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most popular methodologies - probit and tobit modeling. We will emphasize both statistical aspects as
well as differences in economic treatment of capital flows of value zero. Our novelty includes the explicit
treatment of cross-sectional dependence and arbitrary correlation between two, intensive and extensive,
margins. The extensive margin is particularly acute for the developing countries as demonstrated in the
Section 3 on empirical facts.
5.1 Methodology
In a system with many zero capital flows, care must be taken to model zero observations and their
relationship with the volumes of capital flows. Note that higher number of investors implies higher asset
trade volumes. However, this extensive margin is negatively correlated the financial, institutional and
informational frictions, and omitting a control for it would lead to overestimation of these barriers on
capital flows. Another source of bias is the selection when country pairs with zero capital flows are
excluded. It induces a positive correlation between the unobserved disturbance terms and various flow
frictions. We refer to Technical Appendix B for an extensive treatment of probit, pseudo-Poisson maximum
likelihood, correlated tobit and panel extensions tailored specifically for our theoretical framework. This
way we aim at structural mapping of theory into empirical exercise.
5.2 From Theory to Data
In our estimation, we combine a number of datasets, covering 71 destination economies (low and middle
income countries) and 25 OECD economies which are investors. The time frame is 2002 to 2010, thus
forming a short unbalanced panel. We use IMF (CPIS), OECD (Globalization statistics), World Bank,
International Country Risk Guide, and others. We overview the coverage and data issues in Appendix C.
Conversion of theoretical model into an estimable model is not straightforward. We exploit the cost
side which has been emphasized in a number of studies. Recall that prices, and thus capital flows in gravity
form, are functions of vi, the cost of the composite input bundle. We measure labor productivity using
wage data - the two are the same under perfect labor market. Wages are purported to be economically
relevant in Egger and Radulescu (2011) too:22 a firm cares about employer-borne taxes of high skilled
workers who are elemental to firm set-up because higher wage costs lead to higher costs of production.
Authors employ the average wage in the manufacturing sector; unfortunately, this measure is unavailable
for many developing countries in our sample. Therefore, we will use a more aggregate measure.
Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2008) emphasize the role of labor productivity rather than costs in the
host country to increase the volume of the FDI flows through the standard marginal profitability effect.
However, such a shock may lower the likelihood of making any new FDI flows by the source country
through a total profitability effect due to an increase in domestic input prices. A sample of 62 OECD
and non-OECD countries over the period 1987-2000 was analyzed using the Heckman procedure with two
margins: one decides how much to invest abroad, while ignoring the fixed setup cost; then, a decision is
made whether to invest at all, taking into account this cost. The key explanatory variable, productivity is
the output per worker as measured by PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker. Productivity is also proxied by
fitting a regression on capital over labor ratio and years of schooling. Though theoretically acknowledged,
22 Egger and Radulescu (2011) concentrate on the effective labor tax rates and bilateral outward FDI stocks among 52
countries in 2002 and document that the employee-borne part of labor taxes determines bilateral FDI significantly different
from zero. Moreover, personal income tax rates turn out somewhat less important than profit tax rates. Taxes affect
FDI in more complicated ways, as emphasized by Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005), which argue that international tax
differentials act on the direction and magnitude of FDI flows in a different way: the source country tax rate works primarily
on the selection process, whereas the host-country tax rate affect mainly the magnitude of the FDI, once they occur. In a
similar spirit of our analysis, Razin and Sadka (2007c) analyze FDI flows along two margins, intensive and extensive. Their
question is the effect of corporate tax rate on FDI flows for 18 OECD economies in a period of 1987-2003. Authors also
analyze the role of labor productivity on the flows (the productivity is measured as output per worker in PPP value). Their
prediction of a positive effect on the intensive margin with an ambiguous effect on the extensive margin finds some empirical
support.
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startup costs are not included in estimating equations. A dummy for a positive lagged FDI is used in
the selection equation. Its positive coefficient is then interpreted as evidence of a lower threshold barrier
for pairs of countries that had positive FDI flows in the past. We allow for dynamics in our extension,
however, wanting a more structural approach and already having accounted for the effects of GDP in our
estimating equations, we measure labor productivity by using wage data.
5.3 Estimating Equilibrium Relations
We seek to map our parsimonious theoretical account of the main forces of capital flows into estimating
relations. Our main equations of interest are as follows (the first one refers to (4.7) whereas the second is
derived in Appendix, see (A.5)),
MFDIni = v1−σn V FDIin E˜iE˜n[PnΠi]1−σ ,
M Ini = γni (τni) EnEiWΠnPi δin,
where E˜i =
∑N
n=1M
FDI
in , and, due to separability, E˜n = En − En. In other words, entire expenditure
is composed of FDI and portfolio capital. Let us re-express all the equations in estimating equilibrium
relations. For that we need to introduce a relative share of portfolio capital in each economy, namely
ωi = Ei/Ei. In such a case, the main estimating equation (4.7) can be re-expressed as
MFDIni = (1− ωi − ωn + ωiωn) v1−σn V FDIin EiEn[PnΠi]1−σ , (5.1)
and the portfolio investment as
M Ini = ωnωiγni (τni)
EiEn
WΠnPi δin.
The sum of both types can be written as a function of source and destination income, and a nonlinear
term that involves composite costs, informational and other frictions, multilateral and bilateral costs,
MFDIni +M Ini =
[(1− ωi − ωn + ωnωi
ωnωi
)
v1−σn V FDIin
[PnΠi]1−σ
+ γni (τni) δin
WΠnPi
]
ωnωiEiEn. (5.2)
Notice that the relative size of portfolio to FDI flows is being pinned down by three intuitive terms, i.e.,
M Ini
MFDIni
= ωnωi1− ωi − ωn + ωiωn
γni (τni)
v1−σn
[PnΠi]1−σ
WΠnPi
δin
V FDIin
, (5.3)
where γni (τni) /v1−σn refers to relative (bilateral) variable costs, associated with investment, (PnΠi)1−σ / (ΠnPi)
stands for the relative multilateral resistance terms, and δin/V FDIin denotes a ratio of extensive margin
terms (factors, affecting the very probability to invest). Taking logs in (5.1) and introducing stochastic
shocks, lead to
lnMFDIni = βFDIin + (1− σ) [αi ln ri + (1− αi) lnwi − lnPn − ln Πi] + lnEi + lnEn + lnV FDIin + εFDIni ,
lnM Ini = βIin + [ln γni (τni)− lnPi − lnΠn] + lnEi + lnEn + ln δin + εIni,
ln
(
M Ini/M
FDI
ni
)
= βI/FDIin + ln γni (τni)− (1− σ) [αi ln ri + (1− αi) lnwi] +
[
ln δin − lnV FDIin
]
,
(5.4)
which justifies using the same expenditure (income) aggregates in both, FDI and portfolio flows.23 We
will use startup costs to model the decision to invest (FDI) and contract enforcement (FPI).24 We proceed
23 The fixed source-destination effects are subsumed within and βFDIin ≡ ln
(
1−ωi−ωn+ωiωn
(1−σ)(ααii (1−αi)1−αi)
)
, βFDIin ≡ ln
(
ωnωi
W
)
and
β
I/FDI
in ≡ ln
(
ωnωi(1−σ)(ααii (1−αi)1−αi)
1−ωi−ωn+ωiωn
[PnΠi]1−σ
WΠnPi
)
.
24 Notice that contract enforcement will be used to proxy for both, γni (τni) and δin. We will also use startup costs to
proxy for institutional setting, also for the purposes to see whether portfolio flow can be treated as the substitute when costs
establishing a long-run business relationship are too high.
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Tab. 6.1: Panel Results of Bilateral FDI Ignoring the Extensive Margin
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS) Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS) Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS)
Log Destination -1.08 -0.80** -1.07 -1.28** -1.28*** -1.28*** -1.18** -1.14*** -1.18***
Income (0.852) (0.344) (0.976) (0.564) (0.467) (0.482) (0.477) (0.418) (0.430)
Log Source 3.66*** 4.14*** 3.68*** 5.26*** 5.32*** 5.26*** 4.99*** 5.080*** 5.00***
Income (1.153) (0.958) (1.120) (0.744) (0.744) (0.578) (0.634) (0.638) (0.512)
Log Lending -1.11*** -1.03*** -1.10* -0.23** -0.27*** -0.24** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.30***
Rate (0.365) (0.157) (0.349) (0.110) (0.090) (0.099) (0.106) (0.071) (0.096)
Log Labor 3.36*** 2.38*** 3.32** 2.51*** 2.56*** 2.51*** 2.51*** 2.48*** 2.51***
Productivity (1.288) (1.005) (1.360) (0.640) (0.508) (0.549) (0.574) (0.416) (0.504)
Observations 736 736 736 3209 3209 3209 3945 3945 3945
Within R2 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
Between R2 0.56 0.64 0.64
Overall R2 0.47 0.56 0.57
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. Pooled OLS refer to pooled least squares where any time-specific effects are assumed to be fixed and the individual
affects are centered around a common intercept; cluster robust standard errors are reported, also directional fixed effects (source and destination countries)
are included. FE stands for fixed effects with the reported Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which help controlling for spatial (cross-sectional) dependence.
RE (GLS) for random effects generalized least squares estimator (effectively a weighted average of within and between estimators which are not reported
separately), also directional fixed effects (source and destination countries) are included. Robust Hausman test has been conducted which works under
clustered standard errors therefore not making a claim of RE being efficient (see Wooldridge (2010) for the procedure). Fixed effects are preferred. Standard
errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
under assumption εFDIni ⊥ εIni which can be relaxed estimating both flows simultaneously with unspecified
covariance structure. The two equations are functions of income at investor and the destination economy,
global effects are captured by the multilateral resistance terms, fixed effects are subsumed within the
income shares ω, and selection effects are taken care by V FDIin and δin (see equations (4.5) and Appendix
(A.4)).
Cragg’s original specification was relaxed by Jones (1992) to allow for correlated errors such that
Σ =
(
σ21 σ1ρ
σ2ρ 1
)
.
Notice that both parts of the (normal) likelihood function (where the lower case variables denote logs of
original ones, i.e., min ≡ lnMin),
li (θ) = 1 [Min = 0] ln [1− Φ (Xinγ)]
+1 [Min > 0]
{
ln
[
Φ
(
[Xinγ + (ρ/σ) (min −Xinβ)]
(
1− ρ2)− 12)]+ ln [φ ((min −Xinβ) /σ)]− ln σ −min} ,
must, however, be maximized simultaneously as there is no two-step procedure to split the likelihood.
Literature has emphasized that if the assumption of homoskedastic, normally-distributed, errors is vio-
lated, then ML estimates are inconsistent.25 Moreover, idiosyncratic shocks for the two margins are likely
to be correlated, thus causing efficiency issues.
6 Baseline Results
We first consider results when the two margins are modelled separately. Table 6.1 demonstrates the
results had we fully ignored the adjustment at extensive margin. Results do not account for changes
25 See Robinson (1982) which demonstrates that ML estimation of latent dummy variable models yields inconsistent esti-
mates if the assumption of normality does not hold.
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Tab. 6.2: Panel Results of Bilateral Portfolio Ignoring the Extensive Margin
Overall Sample
Variables Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS)
Log Destination 0.269*** 0.0866*** 0.0837***
Income (0.0185) (0.0266) (0.0259)
Log Source 0.1567*** 1.083*** 1.032***
Income (0.0293) (0.0662) (0.0634)
Contract Risk 0.496** 0.425* 0.476**
(0.213) (0.236) (0.231)
Observations 2,738 2,738 2,738
Within R2 0.190 0.1897
Between R2 0.7773
Overall R2 0.6659
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. Pooled OLS refer to pooled least squares where any time-specific effects are assumed to be fixed and the individual
affects are centered around a common intercept; cluster robust standard errors are reported, also directional fixed effects (source and destination countries)
are included. FE stands for fixed effects with the reported Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which help controlling for spatial (cross-sectional) dependence.
RE (GLS) for random effects generalized least squares estimator (effectively a weighted average of within and between estimators which are not reported
separately), also directional fixed effects (source and destination countries) are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
in capital network evolution, effectively treating the variable V FDIin as irrelevant. The measures of fit
refer to within (R-squared from the mean-deviated regression), between (the squared correlation between
predicted values using FE and the within-individual means of the original dependent variable) and overall
(the squared correlation between predicted values using FE and the untransformed dependent variable).
For completeness, we report the results using marginal product of capital rather than the lending rate
in the Appendix D.1. As neoclassical theory suggests, the lower income abroad should incentivize the
investment - this seems to be the case for MICs and overall sample (the elasticity of destination income is
negative). Investment increases in source income and destination labor productivity (wages) but decreases
in capital rental rate (lending rate).
Similarly, Table 6.2 reports results of intensive margin only for portfolio flows (see estimating equations
reported in (5.4) which underlie the following results). The surprising result concerns contract variable
whose higher value indicates higher risk of contract violation. This might be the reflection of the country
group included in the analysis which are being targets because of higher returns despite excess risk
associates with capital expropriation. Alternatively, this can illustrate the misspecification using the
intensive margin only.
Another extreme is to consider extensive margin only. Though our largely static theory does not
directly lead to accounting for the persistence in variables, it is suspected that margins are auto-correlated.
Provided fixed costs constituted a substantial part of total costs, we should observe a persistence in
extensive margin. In other words, conditioning on the previous period’s existence of an investment
relationship, should affect decision for the current investment. Therefore, we use a dynamic probit to
explore the temporal effects. If the margin at time zero is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity,
inconsistent estimators are obtained (an example of the so-called initial conditions problem). Heckman’s
method is considered to be most precise and beats the existing alternatives (see a study by Miranda
(2007) which compares estimators in a Monte Carlo study). In the Table 6.3, we report the first stages
(probit) estimates after we allow for the investment probability to depend on the decision in the previous
period. As opposed to Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, here the extensive (not the intensive) margin is considered.
The results indicate that persistence is found to be quite significant and robust across country groups.26
However, having a short unbalanced panel, we stick to less computationally intensive methods whose
26 For the methodological issues on how to estimate a dynamic probit model, see Stewart (2006, 2007).
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Tab. 6.3: Dynamic Probit Model for the FDI Decision
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables No DFE With DFE No DFE With DFE No DFE With DFE
Lagged Dummy for FDI 1.693*** 0.958*** 1.250*** 0.632*** 1.439*** 0.752***
(0.0677) (0.0807) (0.0405) (0.0482) (0.0341) (0.0409)
Log Lending Rate -0.144** 0.145 -0.0602 -0.0722 -0.105*** -0.0667
(0.0697) (0.284) (0.0407) (0.0996) (0.0339) (0.0940)
Log Labor productivity -0.0416 0.468 -0.195*** 0.783*** 0.111*** 0.528**
(0.0532) (0.534) (0.0453) (0.285) (0.0265) (0.244)
Log Startup Costs -0.0362 -0.116 -0.0489** 0.128* -0.0450*** 0.0350
(0.0315) (0.0873) (0.0209) (0.0665) (0.0169) (0.0514)
Observations 2266 4609 6875
Log likelihood -971.63 -776.92 -2582.19 -2159.61 -3638.61 -2982.78
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.36 0.17 0.31 0.2361 0.37
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. DFE refers to the directional (source and destination) fixed effects. The estimation method
is random effects dynamic probit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood. Integrals are evaluated using Gaussian–Hermite
quadrature points. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications
include a constant term.
results are testable in a more straightforward manner and which correspond to the static theory more
closely.27.We interpret the finding of persistence as suggesting that empirically fixed and startup costs
need to be included in the static (steady state) specifications for the decision to invest (extensive margin).
Having considered the two margins separately, we map the theory to data by introducing the mecha-
nism that governs not only the choice of capital intensity but also the likelihood of investment. The use
of two-part (also known as hurdle) model seems natural as it is mainly driven by economic arguments:
the decision to start investing in an economy and the volume of investment are governed by non-identical
mechanisms as portrayed in theory. The first part of the model estimates the probability of observing
a positive capital flow (known as the selection or participation equation) while the second estimates the
volume of capital conditional on observing positive flows. Therefore, such statistical specifications as tobit
are too restrictive as they assume a single mechanism for both intensive and extensive margins. Yet, the
two-part models which assume conditional independence of deciding on investing and the amount also
raises a question of reliability. Therefore, we will also explore models which explicitly allow correlation be-
tween two investment margins. Note that the first part of the model estimates the probability of observing
a positive capital flow while the second estimates the volume of capital conditional on observing positive
flows.28 Table 6.4 collects result from different methods which account for the two decisions. Lognormal
hurdle refers to the model where the variable can be decomposed into a product of an indicator function
and lognormally distributed capital flow, provided it is positive.
The panel data two-part models comply well to the traditional pooling estimation absent unobserved
effects (see Wooldridge, 2010). The needed adaptation is the robust variance matrix estimator to account
for the serial correlation in the score across time dimension.29 However, the existence of unobserved
effects creates an incidental parameters problem for “small” T panels when we want to estimate these
effects together with the other model’s parameters and error variances. One of the solutions is to assume
independence of the unobserved effects and covariates along with several other assumptions. This would
27 Not only initial condition problem needs to be addressed but also multivariate normal probability functions of order
T are required. One possibility is to resort to simulated likelihood method and estimate a simulated multivariate random
effects probit. Relying on underlying assumptions and imposed structure, we feel a static specification is better suited for
the data at hand.
28 Vuong test strongly rejects the lognormal in favor of the truncated model in terms of fit with p value of 0.000.
29 For the dynamically complete panel data model (i.e., D (Mit | Xit, Mit−1, Xit−1, . . .) = D (Mit | Xit) where D (·)
denotes conditional distribution of Mit), inference is the same as would be for the independent cross sections.
6 Baseline Results 20
Tab. 6.4: Pooled and Panel Bilateral FDI at Extensive and Intensive Margins
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Tab. 6.5: Pooled and Panel Bilateral Portfolio at Extensive and Intensive Margins
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yield a random effects tobit model. However, we are interested in the “dual” nature of capital flows
and proceed to a two-step estimation procedure to unravel two margins. As before, a full sample probit
estimation is followed by a selection equation carried out on the positive-flows subsample. The model
assumes that different sets of variables could be used in the two-step estimations. Crucially, the second
method, exponential type II tobit, allows for conditional correlation between selection and positive flow
equations, even after controlling for observable covariates.
We further relax the crucial random effects assumption of independence of individual effects and inde-
pendent variables and enable analysis when error terms in decision and volume equations are correlated.
To achieve this in the panel probit model, we follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and use the Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach. The unobserved effects are proxied by the observables which are time averages
of the independent variables Xit and this helps dealing with more general unobserved heterogeneity.30
However, we go further and consider a case when error terms in decision and volume equations are cor-
related. Using additional variables (time averages of explanatory variables) together with the T inverse
Mills ratios yields consistent estimates in the conditional FDI flow equation, provided the model is not
misspecified. We report results of this procedure under the heading “Mundlak Chamberlain Panel”.31
Further robustness checks are given in Appendix D.
As is clear from Table 6.4, extensive margin (or the decision to invest) is affected by the startup costs
(entry barriers) only for the LICs, consistently among estimation methods. Indeed, market entry barriers
are consistent with many zeroes and absence of investment links. Further, labor productivity is a strong
and consistent determinant of the decision to invest only for MICs and overall sample. Lending rate,
though always negative, never affects investment decision (establishing a link) significantly. This can
reflect the fact that financial markets are underdeveloped in low and middle income countries, therefore,
making investors rely on access to financial markets elsewhere.
We further find that source income is a strong predictor of the volume of capital. Finally, labor
productivity matters for the intensity, consistently across estimations.32 This finding is supportive of
supply side arguments - productivity at destination market, conditional on other factors, affects the
intensity of direct investment.
Regarding portfolio flows, once both margins are considered, the effect of contract vanishes (see Table
6.5). However, it seems that portfolio flows act as substitutes for the FDI, since startup costs positively
correlate with the probability to engage in FPI, after conditioning on other included variables. The puzzle
of higher destination income conditionally attracting more portfolio investment persists. To draw more
reliable inferences, we require more data on this type of investment, especially for the least developed
countries. However, the potential interaction between FDI promises to be an important research direction
which we hope to follow with new data arrivals.
In summary, zeroes of investment flows require both theoretical and empirical treatment. We observe
30 Moreover, this approach is somewhat similar to the recent contribution by Pesaran (2006) where cross sectional averages
are used to mimic common factors, similarly to global approach in Dees, Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), where global
unobserved factor can be approximated by observable cross sectional averages.
31 An alternative to this approach is that of Kyriazidou (1997). The method relies on differencing out the selection and
unobservable individual effects. The proposed estimator is of nonparametric nature and requires kernel weights. The choice
of kernel density function and a sequence of bandwidths is not trivial. Moreover, the window widths crucially affect the
variance of the limiting distribution of the estimator and sensitivity is an issue for smaller samples. Therefore, we resort to
a parametric approach which allows for sufficiently general unobserved heterogeneity.
32 An interesting observation - when we include marginal product of capital (see Appendix) - the correlation between the
decision to invest and the volume choice varies significantly among country groups. A strong negative correlation exists for
LICs, stating that the unobserved factors which affect the investment decision have a strong negative effect on how much
to invest. There is no statistical relationship for the MICs; a moderate positive correlation between decisions exists for
overall sample. We apply both pooled probit which is consistent estimator with the cluster-robust errors to correct for error
correlation over time. Alternatively, one can fit the random effects model proposed by Butler and Moffitt (1982) which still
maintains the homoskedasticity assumption but extends the pooled model by allowing cross period correlation. However,
the gain in panel setting is marginal because random effects maintain the assumption of independence in individual effects
and explanatory variables.
7 Robustness 23
that ignoring extensive margin affects estimates and their statistical significance. Most importantly, mod-
eling two margins reveals differences among developing countries. This is critical for both, understanding
the current developments and drawing policy implications, in particular across development stages.
7 Robustness
We deviate from the baseline model, and consider a number of robustness checks. We analyze how results
change once investment threshold is allowed to be non-zero. Further, despite accounting for the two
margins, we investigate more flexible dependence structures than are admitted by our previous techniques.
Finally, we also check other theory implied results for both FDI and portfolio flows which at least partly
confirm the validity of theoretical specification. Further, in Appendix we experiment with pseudo Poisson
maximum likelihood as proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2007) and marginal product instead of
lending rate.
7.1 Stability and Endogenous Investment Threshold
One of the main problems regarding statistical treatment of FDI lies in its very definition that requires
an equity stake of 10% or more for an investment to be classified as FDI. In general, FDI itself has
three components: equity capital, intra-firm loans, and reinvestment of retained earnings. Because of this
definition, it is not clear if all zeroes are indeed unique - there might be “marginal” investments which
are not reported. Moreover, there might be measurement errors that produce this result instead of being
a deliberate choice of investors, which would be at odds with our theoretical motivation.
We start by considering how parameters behave once we model different quantiles of capital flows,
rather than its conditional mean. This helps to avoid parametric assumptions about the error term. We
plot in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 the bootstrapped parameters and their confidence intervals from both
FDI and portfolio quantile (median) regressions (without and with directional fixed effects to otherwise
baseline specifications). For FDI flows, the effects exerted by source are always positive, mainly positive
for labor productivity (in particular, for LICs),33 and varies for lending rate depending on the quantile
(tends to be negative for LICs). Destination income has mainly negative effect only if directional fixed
effects are accounted for (thus capital intensity increases with lower development, but only conditional on
fixed effects which mimic multilateral resistance terms). Intuition is mainly confirmed - the investor should
be more developed to engage in FDI whereas more opportunities are found at destinations which have
a conditionally higher labor productivity and conditionally lower income. Portfolio flows are positively
related to source income but very weakly related to destination income and contract risk, both effects
being largely dependent on the quantile. Again, failure to account for the directional fixed effects would
have led to erroneous conclusions of source income exerting no (or slightly negative) effects on portfolio
flows.
Another problem related to parameter stability concerns the nature of zero flows. Eaton and Tamura
(1994) developed an early solution to incorporate zeros that can be thought of as a model of ln (Mni + a)
where instead of arbitrarily setting a = 1, it is instead treated as a parameter to be estimated. In
our context, one could think of a as a minimum investment level that is needed to be incurred before
the flow is accounted for. Effectively, this is an extended tobit which defines a strictly positive latent
variableM?ni and a threshold aˆ which, unfortunately, lacks a compelling structural interpretation. Another
drawback of ET Tobit is that it is not a “canned” program. Tobit’s consistency requires homoskedastic
errors, an assumption barely met in a multi-country setting with countries of different sizes, development
levels, and other characteristics, both observable and unobservable.34 Martin and Pham (2008) consider
33 We also graph parameters for LIC and MIC countries separately, however, report results for a full sample. Other graphs
are available from authors.
34 Eaton and Kortum (2001) propose another method that has the advantage of being both easier to implement and
interpret. Suppose that there is minimum level of investment, Mminni , such that if “ideal” capital flow, M?ni, falls below Mminni
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Fig. 7.1: Simple OLS (horizontal lines) and quantile coefficients and their confidence intervals for FDI
(left) and portfolio (right) flows without directional fixed effects
Fig. 7.2: Simple OLS (horizontal lines) and quantile coefficients and their confidence intervals for FDI
(left) and portfolio (right) flows with directional fixed effects
7 Robustness 25
DGPs involving threshold values and find that tobit and Heckman methods outperform the Poisson PML
(though see Appendix B.2.1 for Poisson regressions). The problem with Tobit is that if the error term is
heteroskedastic, such that bilateral trade has a constant variance to mean ratio, it is inconsistent whereas
Poisson or multinomial PMLs are unbiased.
Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2009) propose estimating a threshold parameter based on a concentrated
least squares method that involves an inverse Mills ratio bias correction term in each regime. The method
is coined as Structural Threshold Regression and is composed of two regressions for two regimes. We
allow for relationship between the variables of interest in each of the two regimes and use different
threshold variables. To operationalize this approach, we implement successive Chow tests for endogenous
thresholds when significant relationship starts appearing. Our results indicate that the behavior of the
main equations remain stable across different levels of capital flows and development stages of receiving
economies.35 Therefore, our results should not suffer from the misspecification of investment threshold in
two-tier (intensive and extensive) estimations. However, parametric assumptions still need to be addressed
to which we turn next.
7.2 Copulae-based Heckman Method
As a robustness check, we resort to the recent contribution by Hasebe and Vijverberg (2012). Parametric
approach is criticized for its sensitivity to the distributional assumption. The alternative involves a
copula where a multivariate distribution is constructed from separately specified marginal distributions.
The Generalized Tukey Lambda (GTL)-Copula approach inserts more flexible marginal distribution into
the copula function. The GTL distribution is a versatile univariate distribution that permits a wide
range of skewness of thick- or thin-tailed behavior in the data that it represents and, therefore, is a good
candidate distribution for modeling the unobservables in the extensive and intensive margin equations.
GTL-copula distribution effectively frees the extensive margin’s model from any particular distributional
assumption.
What is more, this flexibility is achieved with just a few additional parameters, which is both parsi-
monious and time-efficient relative to semi- or non-parametric approaches. The collective set of copulas
accommodates diverse dependence structures between two random variables. Unlike the traditional esti-
mator (the normal-Gaussian estimator), the GTL-copula estimator is much less dependent on the presence
of an instrument in the selection equation that fulfills the exclusion restriction, no longer making it prob-
lematic that the extensive margin equation contains the same explanatory variables as the capital volume
equation.
We experiment with different copula functions governing the dependence between the errors in the
capital flows equation and extensive margin. In Table 7.1, we report Gaussian copula results with probit
(Normal) marginal distribution of the error term in the extensive margin. Though we do not report, in
addition to Normal, we also allow for errors to have Student’s t marginal distributions in the capital flows
equation. Our main predictions are in line with previous results, the capital tends to flow to countries
with larger income, after conditioning on other theory implied variables.
Table 7.2 collects information on portfolio flows. It confirms the importance of startup costs and
contract risk for establishing a portfolio investment link for the low income countries only. The startup
costs preserve the significance across development stages unlike the contract risk. Higher destination
income creates more opportunities and therefore makes investment larger in magnitude whereas source
income, unlike FDI, plays no important role (if anything, less prosperous investors seem to favour portfolio
investment).
we observe Mni = 0 but otherwise we observe Mni = M?ni. To estimate the model, all the observed zeros are replaced with
minimum valueMminni for each bilateral link and the new bottom-coded lnMni is the dependent variable in a Tobit command
that allows for a user-specified lower limit of lnMminni . Method’s advantage is easy implementation and no requirement of
exclusion restrictions.
35 Results are not reported but available upon request.
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Tab. 7.1: Copula-based FDI Flows Model
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Copula
Intensive Margin of Log FDI
Log Destination Income 0.448*** 0.681*** 0.683***
(0.143) (0.0517) (0.0407)
Log Source Income 0.406*** 0.599*** 0.561***
(0.0961) (0.0453) (0.0419)
Log Lending Rate 0.254 0.502*** 0.589***
(0.307) (0.163) (0.149)
Log Labor productivity 0.0870 0.720*** -0.280**
(0.245) (0.221) (0.117)
Extensive Margin of FDI
Log Startup Costs -0.0693** -0.122*** -0.0985***
(0.0347) (0.0223) (0.0185)
Log Lending Rate -0.267*** -0.0760 -0.153***
(0.0895) (0.0526) (0.0458)
Log Labor productivity -0.0566 -0.256*** 0.134***
(0.0675) (0.0603) (0.0329)
Log σ 1.2456*** 1.2382*** 1.2730***
(0.1091) (0.0390) (0.0373)
Ancillary θ -1.3335*** -1.6772*** -1.6252***
(0.2146) (0.0917) (0.0864)
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. θ refers to the dependence parameter in the copula frame-
work. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
Tab. 7.2: Copula-based Portfolio Flows Model
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Copula
Intensive Margin of Log Portfolio
Log Destination Income 0.1435** 0.2178*** 0.2331***
(0.0694) (0.0273) (0.0259)
Log Source Income 0.0308 -0.0628* -0.0614*
(0.0628) (0.0345) (0.0332)
Extensive Margin of Portfolio
Contract Risk -0.3791*** -0.0070 0.0821**
(0.0490) (0.0545) (0.0407)
Log Startup Costs -0.0901*** -0.1278*** -0.2865***
(0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0179)
Log σ 0.6430*** 0.8477*** 0.8103***
(0.1489) (0.1165) (0.0429)
Ancillary θ -0.7164*** -0.4985 -0.3734**
(0.2672) (0.3630) (0.1452)
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. θ refers to the dependence parameter in the copula frame-
work. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
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Tab. 7.3: Theory Implied Relationships: Ratio and Sum of Capital Flows
Log Ratio ( M
I
ni
MFDI
ni
) Log Sum (MIni +MFDIni )
Variables FE (with incomes) FE (without incomes) FE (with incomes) FE (without incomes)
Log Destination -0.4323 - -1.7425*** -
Income (0.6026) - (0.4870) -
Log Source 1.0240 - 4.9515*** -
Income (1.2296) - (0.8850) -
Log Lending 0.1717 0.1529 -0.2824 -0.5286
Rate (0.9028) (0.8982) (0.2888) (0.3528)
Log Labor -1.9304** -1.7727*** 4.0875*** 5.1349***
Productivity (0.8566) (0.6504) (0.5759) (0.4440)
Log Startup 0.6402** 0.6049** 0.0022 -0.1737
Costs (0.2514) (0.2401) (0.0915) (0.1302)
Contract -0.0518 -0.0631 0.0778 -0.0249
Risk (0.1502) (0.1544) (0.0979) (0.1236)
Observations 1301 1301 1855 1855
Within R2 0.0156 0.0150 0.1622 0.1313
F test (incomes irrelevant) F (2, 370) = 0.35, p = 0.7062 F (2, 423) = 15.84, p = 0.0000
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. FE stands for fixed effects with the reported Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which help controlling for
spatial (cross-sectional) dependence. Inverse Mill’s ratios are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%,
5% and 1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
7.3 Theory Implied Relationship Between FDI and FPI
Recall the sum and ratio of the two types of investment, as reported in equations (5.2) and (5.3). The
sum implies that the main driving forces are source and destination income, with all other terms entering
as one nonlinear term whereas the ratio makes sure that the effects of income are eliminated.
To have a glimpse about this prediction, we construct a new variable which is a ratio of bilateral capital
flows (portfolio to FDI). We take logs of (5.2) and (5.3) and consider random and fixed effects regressions
for both specifications. Using robust (applicable with cluster-robust standard errors) Hausman test, as
outlined in Wooldridge (2010), we conclude that fixed effects are preferred.36
Table 7.3 describes results once fixed effects and Mill’s ratios are controlled for. The income effects
disappear in the ratio and prevails in the sum, as predicted by theory. Labor productivity dictates the
capital flow - it increases the sum and decreases the portfolio investment. Hence, FDI is attracted,
conditional on other regressors, to countries with higher labor productivity. Startup costs make portfolio
investment more attractive. There is some evidence that more conditional opportunities arise in less
developed countries. Neither lending rate nor contract risk seem to play a significant role when both
capital types are considered together.
8 Conclusions
Today’s economic landscape is quickly changing and calls for an enquiry into global adjustments and
capital flows, in particular with regard to low–income countries (LICs). To address recent intensification
of capital flows to LICs, we analyze intensive and extensive margins of capital flows (the size of a flow versus
a number of investors and receiving countries). Our motivation involved many zeroes in capital flows,
in particular in early 2000s. The network structure has considerably changed along both dimensions.
We set a theoretical model where the investment decision involves a share of costs which is fixed in
36 The null of no systematic differences is rejected in both cases. In ratio case, F (4, 475) = 7.00 whereas in the sum case
F (6, 581) = 41.48. The associated p values are zero.
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nature thereby generating two-stage decision and path dependency. FDI is portrayed as a supply whereas
portfolio as a demand stories. We then map the theoretical account into an econometric framework,
allowing for flexible estimation methods. Ignoring extensive margin affects estimates and their statistical
significance. Results indicate that market entry costs do statistically affect decision to invest only for
the LICs, consistently among estimation methods. This result, however, depends on whether dynamics is
allowed for. Once lagged value of extensive margin is introduced, the effect of startup costs is dampened
if not lost. Generally, market entry barriers are consistent with many zeroes and absence of links, and
most probably reflect institutional environment, as emphasized in Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych
(2008).
LICs do not follow neoclassical arguments in neither of specifications and call for further investigation.
Lending rate, though always negative, never affects investment decision (establishing a link) significantly.
Labor productivity turns out to be a strong and consistent determinant of the decision to invest only
for MICs and overall sample but matters for the intensity, consistently across estimations. At intensive
margin, source income is a strong predictor of the volume of capital. Capital costs (lending rate) negatively
affects the volume of capital, though is less robust predictor. Labor productivity matters for the intensity,
consistently across estimations.
These results, demonstrating differences at two investment margins for different country groups, call
for more research along the proposed lines. We foresee an extension with an explicit role for bilateral
trade to be particularly promising.37 This should be particularly easy as trade flows can be modeled using
the same gravity framework (despite details of microfoundations, under mild qualifications, trade yields
gravity relationship, see Head and Mayer, 2015).
Seeking a parsimonious approach, we have abstracted from a number of important issues. One relates
to the risks of volatility and its effect on growth prospects (see contribution by Aghion and Banerjee
(2005) whose framework might be useful to introduce capital flows). Also, abundance of natural resources
constitutes an important source of attractiveness to invest and need a more complex modeling environment
where, as in traditional Hecksher-Ohlin economy, endowment plays a role in determining a capital flow’s
direction and intensity.38 Statistically, we are still constrained in time dimension and foresee many more
explorations with explicit role for dynamics, especially from network’s perspective, once more and better
quality data become available. In such a case, we would be able to track transmission of shocks and
spatio-temporal evolution capital movements, drawing from the current contribution due to Rebucci,
Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Xu (2012) which analyze how changes in trade linkages between China, Latin
America, and the rest of the world have altered the transmission mechanism of international business
cycles to Latin America.39 This is an important extension needed for tracking macro-financial stability
and transmission of macro policies globally, in particular to more fragile low income countries.
37 One advantage from macroeconomic perspective is the analysis of Balance of payments, BoP. We have analyzed capital
account but still lack account and interaction of another, current account. Recall that BoP = Current Account + Capital
Account + Error Term (balancing item).
38 Esfahani, Mohaddes, and Pesaran (2012, 2014) draw long run implications of a resource discovery, unlike the standard
literature on the “Dutch disease” and the “resource curse”. Real output in the long run is shaped by oil exports through
their impact on capital accumulation, and the foreign output as the main channel of technological transfer.
39 The evidence reported also suggests that the emergence of China as an important source of world growth might be the
driver of the so called “decoupling” of emerging markets business cycle from that of advanced economies reported in the
existing literature.
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Appendix
A Derivations
A.1 Firms’ Decisions
The firms take the residual demand in (4.2) as given and maximize profits by choosing a price. In any
country i, the profit a ϕ−firm is given by
max
{pi(ω)}≥0
pii (ϕ) = (pi (ω)− viτinϕ)
(
Qi
(
pi (ω)
Pi
)−σ)
− vifin, (A.1)
where the first order condition leads to(
1− σ + σviτinϕpi (ω)−1
)(
Qi
(
pi(ω)
Pi
)−σ)
= 0,
and produces the price pin (ω) = σσ−1viτinϕ. Notice that the revenue is given by
Rin (ϕ) ≡ pin (ω) qin (ω) = pin (ω)1−σ QnPnσ
=
(
σ
σ−1cin (ϕ)
)1−σ
QnPn
σ =
(
σ
σ−1cin (ϕ)
)1−σ PnQn
Pn1−σ .
Plugging price into profit yields piin (ϕ) = pin(ϕ)qin(ϕ)σ − vifin = Rin(ϕ)σ − vifin. Finally, the payment to
the factors of production are uncovered from the cost minimization problem,
min{li(ϕ)}≥0, {ki(ϕ)}≥0 rik (ϕ) + wil (ϕ) = Cin (q) =
r
αi
i w
1−αi
i
α
αi
i (1−αi)1−αi
(qτinϕ+ fin)
s.t. y = kαi l1−αiϕ = qi (ω) = Qi
(
pi(ω′)
Pi
)−σ
.
The associated Lagrangian yields the results as in the main text. However, a simpler approach is to
observe that with the competitive factor markets, the payments are just marginal costs
wilin (ϕ) = (1− αi) σ−1σ pin (ϕ) yin (ϕ) = (1− αi) σ−1σ Rin (ϕ) ,
rikin (ϕ) = αi σ−1σ pin (ϕ) yin (ϕ) = αi
σ−1
σ Rin (ϕ) .
A.2 Agents’ Decisions
We build on Burnside and Tabova (2009); Tabova (2010) and Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) and
demonstrate how the FDI model can be extended to portfolio flows in a global economy with N countries.
Following the latter contribution, we define N+ 2 assets where the first N assets are country-specific risky
assets, also a risk-free bond that is in zero net supply and an asset whose return is perfectly correlated
with the global shock which is in zero net supply. A simplifying assumption is the existence of the global
asset which allows hedging against the global risk factor, so that the only risk that matters for portfolio
allocation across the N equity is the country-specific risk. Let the amount to be invested be Wi, total
income Ei, consumption Qi, the price of an asset P Ii and Ii is the country i’s equity. A simple accounting
relation is described by
Wi = Ei − PiQi = P Ii Ii.
The decision space includes consumption, allocation of wealth across N+ 2 assets, and production. The
agent’s budget constraint is
WiRi = (Ei − PiQi)Ri,
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where Ri is the mean return in country i’s assets. Then, the portfolio return is a weighted average,
Rpi =
N∑
n=1
wniRj + wigRg + wifRf ,
where win describes country i’s fraction invested in country n, wig is the fraction invested in the global
asset and wif is the share invested in the risk-free asset. It is assumed that due to differences in language
and regulatory systems, and easier access to local information, domestic agents are more informed than
foreigners about the idiosyncratic payoff innovations on domestic equity claims. From the perspective of
agents in country i, n has a mean of 0 and variance
τniσ
2
n,
where information asymmetry is captured by τni > τnn when n 6= i.
A.2.1 Optimal Agents’ Decisions
Denote wii the share invested in the domestic economy, wni the vector of shares invested in i from j.40
Then the fraction employed in the riskless activity, wif , is:
wif = 1− wii −
N−1∑
n=1
win.
We then have to define the investor’s budget constraint, also maximize the utility subject to the budget
constraint and impose regularity conditions to obtain the solutions. We choose a special case of iso-elastic
utility function, limη→1 Q
1−η−1
1−η = ln (Q) .41 With the logarithmic utility, we obtain that consumption is
c = ρI
and optimal shares are
wii = σ−2P
[
(RP − rf )− w′ifω
]
and
win = Σ˜−1F
[
(RF − rf ι)− ωwii − S−1 (win) Pr (qin)
]
= Σ˜−1F
[
(RF − rf ι)− ωσ−2P
[
(RP − rf )− w′ifω
]
− S−1 (win) Pr (qin)
]
,
where Pr (qin) is the probability of contract violation in country n for investment from i, diag (win) is a
diagonal matrix of weights and
S (win) = IN−1 − diag (win) =

1− wi1 0 · · · 0
0 1− wi2 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · 1− wiN
 .
These equations show that the international investor behaves as a mean-variance investor. For example,
the share of capital invested in each foreign economy equals its expected excess return relative to its
variance and covariance and corrected for the risk of expropriation.
40 See Tille and van Wincoop (2010) which focus on the new approximation and solution method to compute optimal shares
in the DSGE framework.
41 We have not used the function form of utility function in the main text, as FDI has been driven by supply side arguments.
To introduce portfolio flows with partial equilibrium flavor, we analyze demand side and its implications for investment.
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With this in mind, one can derive the optimal investment shares,
wni = γni (τni)
[
E (Ri −Rf )− θn
θg
E (Rg −Rf )
]
,
where γni (τni) is a constant that includes τni, θn/θg determines the strength of a transmitter of global
payoff innovation with θg =
∑N
n=1 (In/I) θn. Then, the optimal share can be re-written as
wni = γni (τni) R˜i,
where R˜i ≡ E (Ri −Rf ) − (θi/θg)E (Rg −Rf ). This yields the total equity holdings Ei by agents from
country i as
Ei =
N∑
n=1
wniWi =
N∑
n=1
γni (τni) R˜iWi,
which gives
Wi =
Ei∑N
n=1 γni (τni) R˜i
= Ei/Pi,
where Pi ≡∑Nn=1wni. This produces the total equity claim by country i on country n as
P InIni = wniWi = γni (τni) R˜iEi/Pi. (A.2)
Bilateral asset demand depends on the price (risk-return ratio) of country i equity relative to an overall
price index. To close the model, we impose a set of market clearing equations,
N∑
i=1
P InIni = P InIn = En,
where P InIn is the country n equity supply which is equal to demand En in equilibrium. This produces
N∑
i=1
P InIn
E =
N∑
i=1
γni (τni) R˜iEi
EPi =
En
E ,
therefore, the returns are described by
R˜i =
En
E
1∑N
i=1
γni(τni)Ei
EPi
= EjE
1
Πn
,
where Πn ≡ ∑Ni=1 γni(τni)EiEPi is the so-called multilateral resistance variable that measures the average
financial frictions for country n as a destination country. Substituting this solution back into (A.2), we
get the following gravity specification for bilateral asset holdings:
P InIni = wniWi =
EnEi
E
γni (τni)
ΠnPi ,
where optimal weights are n’s share in total equity weighted by the relative financial friction γni (τni) /Πn,
i.e., wni = EnE
γni(τni)
Πn .
Introduction of the fixed costs of holding foreign assets partitions investors into two groups: investors
with access to international financial markets (all equity) and investors with no such access (only domestic
equity). Both groups can still invest in the risk-free and global assets. This changes the optimal shares
for domestic investors, namely,
wDnn = γnn (τnn) R˜n,
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and investors with the access to international finance,
wAni = γni (τni) R˜i,
where R˜i ≡ E (Ri −Rf )− (θi/θg)E (Rg −Rf ). The market equilibrium yields
Ei =
N∑
n=1
wAniW
A
n + wDiiWDi =
N∑
n=1
γni (τni) R˜iWAn + γii (τii) R˜iWDi (A.3)
and
R˜i = Ei
W
[∑N
n=1 γni(τni)(W
A
n /W )+γii(τii)(WDi /W)
]
= Ei
W
[∑N
n=1 γni(τni)(W
A
n /W )δin
] = EiΠiW ,
where
δin =
{
1, i 6= n
Wi/W
A
i , i = n
, (A.4)
and Wi = WAi + WDi , Πi ≡
∑N
n=1 γni (τni)
(
WAn /W
)
δin, W =
∑N
n=1W
A
n . Using the aggregate demand
for equity in country i in (A.3) yields
Ei/Pi = WAi ,
hence,
Pi = EiWAi =
∑N
n=1 γni(τni)R˜iW
A
n +γii(τii)R˜iWDi
WAi
= EiΠiW
∑N
n=1 γni(τni)W
A
n δin
WAi
= PiΠiW
∑N
n=1 γni (τni)WAn δin
= ∑Nn=1 γni(τni)δinWEiΠi = 1Ei
∑N
n=1 γni(τni)δinW∑N
n=1 γni(τni)(W
A
n /W )δin
= 1Ei
∑N
n=1 γni (τni) δinW.
Plugging this result into flows equation, we obtain
Mni = wAniWAi = γni (τni) R˜iEi/Pi = γni (τni) EnW
A
i
WΠn
= γni (τni) EnW
A
i δin
WΠn = γni (τni)
EnEi
WΠnPi δin
(A.5)
because δin = 1 when i 6= n and WAi = δiiWi. This is the equation reported in the main text (see (5.4)),
and used for estimation.
B Econometric Methodology
B.1 Estimating Relations
We first need to connect decisions made by firms and agents into one estimable setting. The main relations
are given by 
MFDIni = (1− ωi − ωn + ωiωn) v1−σn V FDIin EiEn[PnΠi]1−σ ,
M Ini = ωnωiγni (τni) EiEnWΠnPi δin,
MIni
MFDIni
= ωnωi1−ωi−ωn+ωiωn
γni(τni)
v1−σn
[PnΠi]1−σ
WΠnPi
δin
V FDIin
.
These results follow from
MFDIni = v1−σn V FDIin
(En−En)(En−En)
[PnΠi]1−σ
= v1−σn V FDIin EnEi[PnΠi]1−σ
(
1−
( Ei
Ei
+ EnEn − EnEiEnEi
))
,
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when we introduce ωi ≡ Ei/Ei and∑Nn=1MFDIin = E˜i = En−En.When considered as a sum,M Ini+MFDIni ,
total (bilateral) capital flow leads to the following cases:
=
[
v1−σn V FDIin
[PnΠi]1−σ
(1− (ωi + ωn − ωnωi)) + γni(τni)δinωnωiWΠnPi
]
EnEi, ωi, ωn 6= 0,
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in EnEi
[PnΠi]1−σ
(1− ωi) = v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in EnE˜i
[PnΠi]1−σ
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in E˜nE˜i
[PnΠi]1−σ
, ωi 6= 0, ωn = 0,
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in EnEi
[PnΠi]1−σ
(1− ωn) = v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in E˜nEi
[PnΠi]1−σ
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in E˜nE˜i
[PnΠi]1−σ
, ωi = 0, ωn 6= 0,
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in EnEi
[PnΠi]1−σ
= v
1−σ
n V
FDI
in E˜nE˜i
[PnΠi]1−σ
, ωi, ωn = 0.
B.2 Probit Specification
We start with the bilateral FDI flow. The log-linearized version of Zin (see footnote 20) is
zin = (σ − 1) ln (σ − 1)− σ ln σ − σ ln vn − (σ − 1) lnϕL + (σ − 1) pn + en
−φi − φn − κφni + vni = γ0 − φi + ζn − σ ln vn − κφni + ηni, (B.1)
where fFDIin = exp (φi + φn + κφni − vni) is stochastic fixed investment cost, ηni ≡ uni+vni ∼ N
(
0, σ2u + σ2v
)
is i.i.d. (yet correlated with the error term uin in the gravity equation at intensive margin), φi is an in-
vestor’s fixed effect, and ζn = (σ − 1) pn + en − φn is a destination country’s fixed effect. These fixed
effects are expected to control for the multilateral resistance terms. Note that zni > 0 when i invests to
n, and zni = 0 when it does not. Scaling zin by the standard deviation σu+v, we obtain the probability
ρji that i decides invest to j, conditional on the observed variables,
ρni = Pr (z?ni > 0 | observed variables)
= Φ (γ?0 + φ?i + ζ?n − σ? ln vn − κ?φni) ,
(B.2)
where the starred variables refer to original ones divided by σu+v and φ?i , ξ?n denote the fixed effects.42
Normalization is justified since the coefficients of a probit can only be estimated up to a scale. Moreover,
the Probit equation can be used to derive consistent estimates of Wni (which is crucial to avoid an
omitted variable problem that biases the estimates). Further, note that inverse Normal maps estimated
probability to the latent variable zni, zˆ?ni = Φ−1 (ρˆni). Note that ηni/σu+v has a unit normal distribution,
therefore, in principle, a consistent estimate is obtainable from the inverse Mills ratio (selection hazard).
We can generate it from the estimation of a probit model where the error term follows a standard
normal distribution. Hence, the approximate estimate of E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0) is simply φ (zˆ?ni) /Φ (zˆ?ni).
The estimate ln
{
exp
(
σu+v(k−σ+1)
σ−1
(
zˆ?ni + ̂E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)
))
− 1
}
43 helps controlling for the potential
correlation between the investment frictions and the average productivity of firms in country i which
decide to invest to n (note that investment barriers affect cutoff productivity level). However, this method
works only under homoskedasticity, a requirement rarely met in practice with bilateral flows data. As a
result, Silva and Tenreyro (2009) claim that conditional expectation of ηniσu+v ≡ uni+vniσu+v , E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)
is inappropriately corrected.44 As is obvious from (B.3), η?ni is replaced by the conditional expectation
42 In empirical trade gravity literature, fixed effects are interpreted as controlling for multilateral resistance terms (which
embody trade costs across trading partners). Whereas in the regional science literature, the fixed effects are treated as the
“repulsive” and “attractive” forces of the exporter and the importer, see, for example, Roy (2004). In this application, fixed
effects control for the system-wide barriers of investment as embodied in (4.6) and (4.8).
43 The selection equation has been derived from a firm-level decision, and it therefore does not contain the unobserved and
endogenous variable Wni ≡ max
{
Z
σu+v(k−σ+1)
σ−1
ni − 1, 0
}
that is related to the fraction of multinationals (direct investors).
The estimate allows mapping E (w?ni | ·, z?ni > 0) into the reported expression.
44 Notably, η?ni enters the model non-linearly that further complicates analysis - an estimator that is robust to incidental
distributional assumptions is non-existent. More importantly, since σu+v(k−σ+1)
σ−1 depends on σu and σv, if either of the
random components of the model is heteroskedastic, this makes the whole term a function of the regressors, which will then
enter the model in a much more complex form.
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and parameter βuη = ρu, η σuσv . The reason lies in Jensen’s inequality, i.e., for any non-linear function
f (·), f (E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)) = f (φ (z?ni) /Φ (z?ni)) 6= E (f (η?ni) | ·, z?ni > 0). Therefore, f (φ (zˆ?ni) /Φ (zˆ?ni))
is not a consistent estimator. However, the approximation is justified if deviation form the conditional
mean, η?ni − φ (z?ni) /Φ (z?ni), is linear in the random term because it would be absorbed by the error of
the equation. Notably, this approximation is likely to be reasonably accurate in many empirical studies.
Fortunately, it is possible to test for heteroskedasticity in the probit specification. Note that σu+v(k−σ+1)σ−1
is proportional to the standard deviation of the error in (B.2). Hence, adding additional regressors z?2ni
and z?3ni to the probit specification and checking for the joint significance would resemble a special case of
White’s test for heteroskedasticity. The test is analogous to a two-degrees-of-freedom RESET test (Ram-
sey, 1969), is also particularly interesting in that it can be interpreted as a normality test (see Newey,
1985). Therefore, this simple test provides a direct check for the validity of the main distributional as-
sumptions required for consistent estimation of the model of interest. RESET test (based on a linear
index) for the probit model should first be applied for the the validity of the results obtained with the
two-stage estimators.45
Substituting estimates into the FDI gravity equation leads to
mni = β′X + ln
{
exp
(
σu+v (k − σ + 1)
σ − 1
(
zˆ?ni + ̂E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)
))
− 1
}
+ βuη ̂E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0) + eni,
(B.3)
where E (uni | ·, z?ni > 0) = βuηE (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0), βuη = ρu, η σuσv and ein is an iid error term E (eni | ·, z?ni > 0) =
0. Note that the term σu+v(k−σ+1)σ−1 contains a relationship between Pareto shape parameter k which is
directly related to firm heterogeneity and as such affects the variance of the error term for different values
of k.46 It is also related to the measure of the extensive margin, which is associated with the elasticity of
substitution σ. 47 Further, when σu+v(k−σ+1)σ−1 increases, the following approximation improves:
ln
{
exp
(
σu+v (k − σ + 1)
σ − 1
(
zˆ?ni + ̂E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)
))
− 1
}
≈ σu+v (k − σ + 1)
σ − 1
(
zˆ?ni + ̂E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0)
)
.
Hence, in this case the terms enter (B.3) approximately linearly. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008)
estimate (B.3) using nonlinear least squares as parameters enter nonlinearly in the expression for w?ni.
The use of E (η?ni | ·, z?ni > 0) to control for E (uni | ·, z?ni > 0) is the Heckman (1979) correction for sample
selection. Notice, however, that the unobserved firm-level heterogeneity is corrected by the additional
control zˆ?ni. At first, (B.1) is estimated, then proceeded to (B.3). To avoid reliance on the normality
assumption for the unobserved capital frictions, valid excluded variables for the second stage are needed.
Observe that zˆ?ni enters both (B.2) and (B.3). The exogenous source of variation that enters only (B.2)
and helps breaking collinearity problem is φni. Economically, this exclusion restriction concerns fixed
investment costs which have bearance on variable transaction costs. In other words, we need variables
which correlate with the zni but not with the residual of the second stage equation. Further, observe that
z?ni includes only destination fixed costs which can be fruitfully exploited to estimate FDI gravity.
Note that the statistical implications of the log transformation of multiplicative models was well
understood at least from Teeken and Koerts (1972). Recently, Jia and Rathi (2008) proposed an anti-log
45 Presence of heteroskedasticity highly complicates the identification of the effects of the covariates in the intensive and
extensive margins as pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2009).
46 In particular, a greater dispersion of productivity (a lower k) decreases the concentration of firms around the cutoff.
This implies a smaller decrease in the mass of operating firms for a given increase in the productivity cutoff.
47 The change in Wni, as defined in Footnote 43, with respect to k is always positive, though it is not straight-
forward to establish the speed of change, ∂Wni
∂k
= σ
2
u+v(k−σ+1)
(σ−1)2 Z
σu+v(k−σ+1)
σ−1
ni lnZni > 0 since Zni > 1 and
∂2Wni
∂k2 =
σ2u+v
(σ−1)2Z
σu+v(k−σ+1)
σ−1
ni lnZni
(
1 + σu+v(k−σ+1)(σ−1) lnZni
)
where cutoff productivities were assumed independent of k. The second
derivative is negative whenever σu+v < − σ−1k−σ+1 (lnZni)−1. Only in this case larger k (or lower firm heterogeneity, see
Chaney, 2008) induces an increase (at a diminishing rate) of extensive margin.
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transformation which reduces the biases of exponentiation in the models with heteroskedastic errors.48
B.2.1 Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator
The Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML), put forward by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro
(2007), is consistent even if the data does not follow a Poisson distribution. Heteroskedasticity undermines
the use of log-linearization by making conditional expectation dependent on the regressors, and Jensen’s
inequality points to inconsistency recovering estimated flows to levels. Given there is no information
on the pattern of heteroskedasticity, PPML seems natural in that it weighs all the observations equally,
since the expected value is assumed to be proportional to the variance, E (Mni) ∝ V ar (Mni). Since this
assumption is unlikely to hold in practice, a failure to fully account for the heteroskedasticity should be
corrected for by an Eicker-White (Eicker, 1963; White, 1980) robust covariance matrix estimator.
There are also other reasons to apply the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator. As
noted by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2007), least squares potentially introduce biases as they drop observa-
tions for which the reported flow value is zero. Moreover, inconsistency results in cases of heteroskedastic
disturbances with the variance dependence on one or more of the regressors. Both concerns can be ad-
dressed using Poisson QML with a robust error covariance matrix. Recently, Arvis and Shepherd (2011)
demonstrated that Poisson QML estimator is the only in the class of (quasi-) ML estimators to preserve
total flows between the actual and estimated bilateral trade matrices. Coined as the “adding up” prob-
lem, it is an important issue as in our application FDI flow equation is linear in a constant term with
an elasticity of 1, εMˆint, const ≡ ∂ ˆlnMint/∂ ln const = 1 or ∂Mˆint/∂const = (1/const) Mˆint. Maximizing
the Poisson QML on the constant scale equalizes the total values of foreign investment. However, its
unintended consequence is a perfect fit between the fixed effects and the multilateral resistance terms (see
Head and Mayer (2015) and references therein).
Table B.1 reports the estimates of Poisson regression whose specification is E (Min |Xin, Min > 0) =
exp (Xinβ) with conditional expectation of error being zero. This approach should control for het-
eroskedasticity and zero values of capital flows, however, lacks mechanisms that give rise to zeroes, also
does not model cross-sectional dependencies or unobserved factors. Regarding results, they are similar
compared to the baseline ones once directional fixed effects are included: destination income enters nega-
tively (though insignificantly), source income exerts positive sign as does labor productivity, and lending
rate is of negative sign (though marginally insignificant). Portfolio regressions mainly differ in the sign
of contract risk - it is always negative as opposed to the baseline results. However, once we allow for
flexible dependence between the two decisions - in the robustness checks that follow - we again arrive at
the similar conclusion with higher risks being associated with the decision not to invest.
B.3 Tobit Specification
As an extension, we also consider a tobit specification. It is especially suited for portfolio investment
when we allow for investor’s decisions at both margins to be correlated. In other words, we introduce
a possibility for the intensive and extensive margins, after controlling for covariates, to be driven by
common factors.
48 With the error term normality, mni = µn + β′xni + εni where mni ≡ lnMni and εni ∼ N
(
0, σ2n
)
, we have
E (mni) = exp
(
µ˜n + β˜
′
xni + σ˜
2
n
2
)
. Note that the variables with tilde must be consistent for E (mni) to be also
consistent. However, this expression over-estimates the expected value because of convexity of exponential function.
However, ignoring correlations between µ˜n, β˜n and σ˜2n, one can write: E (mni) = exp (µ˜n)
∏I
n=0 exp β˜nxni exp
(
σ˜2n
2
)
where E exp (µ˜n) = exp
(
µn +
˜
σ2µ˜n
2
)
and E exp
(
β˜nxni
)
= exp
(
βnxni +
(
˜xniσβ˜n
)2
2
)
, therefore, E˜ (mni) =
exp
(
µ˜n − σ˜
2
µ˜n
2
)∏I
n=0 exp
(
β˜nxni −
(
˜xniσβ˜n
)2
2
)
exp
(
σ˜2n
2
)
, where the adjustment for exp
(
σ˜2n/2
)
is omitted for simplicity.
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Tab. B.1: Poisson Regressions for Capital Flows
FDI LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Without DFE With DFE Without DFE With DFE Without DFE With DFE
Log Destination 0.5767*** -0.5724 0.7733*** -0.0550 0.7564*** -0.0989
Income (0.0756) (2.0248) (0.0315) (0.9153) (0.0244) (0.7901)
Log Source 0.7112*** 1.8226 0.5853*** 2.1060* 0.5909*** 2.1778**
Income (0.1092) (2.4859) (0.0285 ) (1.1582) (0.0290) (1.0234)
Log Lending -1.6749*** -0.8244 0.2198*** -0.3689 0.1259* -0.3819*
Rate (0.3435) (0.5037) (0.0647) (0.2329) (0.0667) (0.2219)
Log Labor 0.1289* 4.4833** 0.6380*** 1.6811 0.6341*** 1.7355**
Productivity (0.0702) (2.0868) (0.1024) (1.0239) (0.0702) (0.8866)
Observations 2476 2476 4616 4616 7092 7092
BIC 192333.6 66372.29 2181070 1531468 2457263 1621971
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. Solved using Quasi ML Fisher scoring (iterated least-squares and expected
information matrix). DFE stands for directional (source and destination countries) fixed effects. Standard
errors are bootstrapped (400 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
All specifications include a constant term.
Portfolio LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Without DFE With DFE Without DFE With DFE Without DFE With DFE
Log Destination 0.3444* 1.0447* 0.2003*** 0.0844 0.2208*** 0.0863
Income (0.1790) (0.5564) (0.0161) (0.0636) (0.0143) (0.0608)
Log Source -0.2111 -0.9182 -0.1146*** 1.0059*** -0.1172*** 0.9993***
Income (0.2032) (0.9054) (0.0292) (0.1399) (0.0281) (0.1398)
Contract -1.3748** -0.0769 -0.4508*** -0.4886** -0.3601*** -0.4886**
Risk (0.5512) (0.7988) (0.0963) (0.2133) (0.0944) (0.1962)
Observations 212 212 2793 2793 3005 3005
BIC 21379.51 9762.037 7696402 1233491 7876161 1250267
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. Solved using Quasi ML Fisher scoring (iterated least-squares and expected
information matrix). DFE stands for directional (source and destination countries) fixed effects. Standard
errors are bootstrapped (400 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
All specifications include a constant term.
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However, the standard tobit does not suit as it restricts the selection mechanism to be from the same
model as that generating the outcome variable. Moreover, failure of homoskedasticity and Normality in the
tobit model has serious consequences. The part models are more flexible and less prone to deviations from
these assumptions.49 The statistical problem, acknowledged by Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) in their
corner-solutions version of the gravity equation, is that the conditional mean of actual flow min cannot
be linear in explanatory variables, because there is a positive probability mass at min = 0. One of the
possible solutions - nonlinear least squares (NLS) - are imperfect because of potential heteroskedasticity
(corner outcomes) in which case NLS are inefficient. More importantly, the coefficients obtained by NLS
estimation of a model for E (lnMin | ·) are hard to give an adequate interpretation. NLS do not allow us
to empirically identify the intensive and extensive margins of world trade.
Let’s first start with the observation that the observed capital flows can be treated as continuously
distributed, non-negative latent variable. Given the fixed costs of entering foreign markets, the decision
of investing will be determined by the latent variables Zin or δin. Let’s first start with the assump-
tion employed by Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) that intensive and extensive margins are independent
conditional on explanatory variables, denoted by D (M?in | Zin, Xin) = D (M?in |Xin) where D (· | ·) is
the conditional distribution, we end up with the two-part or hurdle model, see Wooldridge (2010).50 A
truncated normal hurdle model by Cragg (1971) with the latent variable (positive capital flows in our
analysis) is assumed to have a truncated normal distribution. Since we are mainly interested in recover-
ing E (Min |Xin, Min > 0), we may not make distributional assumptions. One method is the smearing
estimate by Duan (1983). However, a direct method would be to estimate E (Min |Xin, Min > 0) as
E (Min |Xin, Min > 0) = exp (Xinβ) ,
and this contains M?in = exp (Xinβ + u). A quasi-MLE is (Fisher) consistent given the conditional mean
is correctly specified. Note that capital flows need not correspond to the chosen density, what only
needed is the same range in the conditional mean as allowed in the chosen density of linear exponential
family (LEF). For every QMLE in LEF there is an asymptotically (or
√
N) equivalent weighted non-
linear least squares (WNLS) estimator if the conditional mean is well specified despite the conditional
variance. Hence, we first estimate a probit Pr (Min > 0 |Xin) = Φ (Xinγ), then obtain QMLE estimates
of E (Min |Xin, Min > 0) = exp (Xinβ). Finally, we can estimate E (Min |Xin) = Φ (Xinγ) exp (Xinβ).
B.3.1 Correlation Between The Margins
As mentioned, the assumption of independent mechanisms generating intensive and extensive margins
seems to be theoretically unjustified. We employ the type II Tobit model which allows for common unob-
served factors thereby extending type I Tobit model. LetM?in = exp (Xinβ + u) and {Pr (Min > 0 |Xin)} =
1 (Xinγ + v > 0), and allow u and v be correlated. That is, let correlation be ρ = Cov (u, v) /σ where
σ =
√
V ar (u). Moreover, let D (ln (M?in)) = N
(
Xinβ, σ
2). To find the density f (Min |Xin, Min > 0),
we, as in Wooldridge (2010), use the change-of-variables formula, leading to
f (Min |Xin, Min > 0) = g (min |Xin, Min > 0) /Min,
49 Flexibility comes from the fact that tobit is just a probit model combined with a truncated regression model, with the
coefficient vectors in the two models restricted to be proportional to each other. The second stage can be modeled using
E (lnMin | Xin, Min > 0) where the crucial assumption being linearity in Xin (alternatively, full maximum likelihood can
be used for efficiency reasons but this requires that errors are jointly normally distributed). Given the interest concentrates
on the conditional expectation only, the log of capital can be estimated as exponential using quasi-MLE without further
distributional assumptions. Moreover, as the theoretical motivation purports, the set of variables affecting decision to
invest and the volume are not identical. This makes results more robust as identification strategy does not rest entirely on
distributional assumptions and the nonlinearity of the inverse of Mills ratio.
50 A standard tobit model does not fit because it assumes that the two decisions are made jointly and affected by the same
explanatory variables.
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where g (· |Xin, Min > 0) is the conditional density of M?in. By Bayesian rule,
Pr (Min > 0 |Xin) g (min |Xin, Min > 0) = Pr (Min > 0 | min, Xin)h (min |Xin) ,
where h (min |Xin) is the conditional density of ln (Min). Let 1 (Xinγ + v > 0) = 1 (Xinγ + (ρ/σ)u+ e > 0)
where v = (ρ/σ)u+ e, u = min −Xinβ and e |Xin, u ∼ N
(
0, 1− ρ2). This leads to
Pr (Min > 0 | min, Xin) = Pr(Min>0|Xin)g(min|Xin,Min>0)h(min|Xin)
= Φ
(
[Xinγ + (ρ/σ) (min −Xinβ)]
(
1− ρ2)− 12) .
Recalling that h (min |Xin) ∼ N
(
Xinβ, σ
2) leads to
f (Min |Xin)
= Φ
(
[Xinγ + (ρ/σ) (min −Xinβ)]
(
1− ρ2)− 12)φ ((min −Xinβ) /σMin) .
Combining with the density for Min = 0, we obtain the log-likelihood
li (θ) = 1 [Min = 0] ln [1− Φ (Xinγ)] + 1 [Min > 0]
×
{
ln
[
Φ
(
[Xinγ + (ρ/σ) (min −Xinβ)]
(
1− ρ2)− 12)]+ ln [φ ((min −Xinβ) /σ)]− ln σ −min} .
Note that ρ = 0 yields a standard lognormal hurdle model. The challenge with this model, in which (u, v)
is independent of Xin and jointly normal, is the identification. Given the set of explanatory variables in
M?in = exp (Xinβ + u) are the same as in {Pr (Min > 0 |Xin)} = 1 (Xinγ + v > 0). Note that the latter
term is a function of (Xin, v) , the law of iterated expectations yields
E (min |Xin, v) = Xinβ + E (u |Xin, v) = Xinβ + E (u | v) = Xinβ + ρσv,
E (v |Xin, 1 (Xinγ + v > 0) = 1) = λ (Xinγ) ≡ φ(Xinγ)Φ(Xinγ) ,
E (min |Xin, 1 (Xinγ + v > 0) = 1) = Xinβ + ρσλ (Xinγ) ,
E (min |Xin, Min > 0) = Xinβ + ρσλ (Xinγ) .
If γ can be consistently estimated, then the last equation can be nominally identified. However, the
nonlinearity of λ (Xinγ) acts as a poor identification strategy, especially over linear ranges. With un-
restricted β, λ (Xinγ) is a function of Xin, arbitrarily close to linear if we relax a probit model on
Pr (Min > 0 |Xin). If the identification is entirely based on E (Min |Xin), the lognormal hurdle (note
that ρσ is not separately identified by E (Min |Xin) sinceXin includes a constant) and the ET2T models
with the same set of regressors yield no differences. Hence, ET2T is more convincing when the covariates
determining the participation decision strictly contain those affecting the amount decision. Then the
model is
Min = 1 [Xinγ + v ≥ 0]× exp
(
X˜inβ˜ + u
)
,
where X˜in ⊂Xin and both include unity as the first element. Given at least one exclusion restriction, β˜
and ρσ are better identified because λ (Xinγ) is not an exact function of X˜in. Note that a linear rather
than exponential model cannot be applied: linear type II Tobit model allows for negative outcomes on
Min.
C Data Issues
C.1 Country Coverage
Developing Countries are selected by PRGT-Eligibility. The list of countries included in the analysis is
produced in the table below (71 countries in total):
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Afghanistan Armenia Bangladesh Benin
Bhutan Bolivia Burkina Faso Burundi
Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Rep.
Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Republic of
Cï¿œte d’Ivoire Djibouti Dominica Eritrea
Ethiopia Gambia, The Georgia Ghana
Grenada Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana
Haiti Honduras Kenya Kiribati
Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Dem.Rep Lesotho Liberia
Madagascar Malawi Maldives Mali
Mauritania Moldova Mongolia Mozambique
Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Niger
Nigeria Papua New Guinea Rwanda Samoa
Sï¿œo Tomï¿œ & Prï¿œncipe Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands
St. Lucia St. Vincent & Grens. Sudan Tajikistan
Tanzania Timor-Leste Togo Tonga
Uganda Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam
Yemen, Rep. Zambia Zimbabwe
C.2 OECD Data
FDI Outflows are expressed in US dollars. The country coverage of reporting economies are (25 countries
in total):
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Denmark Finland France Germany
Greece Iceland Ireland Israel
Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal
Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom
United States of America
C.3 CPIS Data
The CPIS measures the global stock and geographical distribution of portfolio investment holdings, as
reported by creditor countries. The survey may have gaps in coverage owing to nonparticipation of some
important investing countries and international financial centers, as well as difficulties faced by many
participating countries in capturing cross-border portfolio investment by households (and in some cases,
enterprises) that do not use the services of resident custodians. The stocks are measured at market value;
thus, annual changes reflect valuation effects and flows.
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C.4 Other Data
Other variable used in the empirical exercises are collected in the table C.3, together with the sources of
data.
Tab. C.3: Sources of remaining variables
Variable Data Source
Contract risk* ICRG, The PRS Group, Inc.
Startup costs World Bank’s Starting Business Database
The marginal productivity of capital (MPK) Lowe, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2012)
Aggregate income IMF (WEO)
Wages ILO (KLIM)
Lending rate World Bank
Proxy for MPK (robustness check) IMF (WEO)
Proxy for labour productivity (cost/GDP) World Bank
* Contract Viability is the variable used, it measures the risk of unilateral contract
modification, cancellation or outright expropriation. A higher value reflects lower risk.
D Robustness Checks
D.1 Panels with MPK
Tab. D.1: Panel Results of Bilateral FDI Ignoring the Extensive Margin
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS) Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS) Pooled OLS FE RE (GLS)
Log Destination 0.84 1.25 0.86 -1.18* -1.08*** -1.18** -0.950* -0.82*** -0.96**
Income (1.516) (1.272) (1.506) (0.609) (0.322) (0.520) (0.555) (0.279) (0.483)
Log Source 2.49 2.61 2.53 5.25*** 5.33*** 5.25*** 4.87*** 4.92*** 4.87***
Income (1.636) (2.036) (1.617) (0.836) (0.432) (0.654) (0.748) (0.395) (0.603)
Log MPK 0.44 0.57 0.44 -0.41 -0.48 -0.41 -0.27 -0.33 -0.27
(0.841) (0.326) (0.696) (0.323) (0.328) (0.280) (0.302) (0.278) (0.259)
Log Labor 0.63 -0.92 0.49 2.55*** 2.37*** 2.55*** 2.46*** 2.23*** 2.47***
Productivity (2.545) (1.538) (2.710) (0.690) (0.385) (0.615) (0.657) (0.302) (0.590)
Observations 499 499 499 2657 2657 2657 3156 3156 3156
Within R2 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
Between R2 0.61 0.69 0.70
Overall R2 0.46 0.59 0.60
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. Pooled OLS refer to pooled least squares where any time-specific effects are assumed to be fixed and
the individual affects are centered around a common intercept; cluster robust standard errors are reported, also directional fixed effects
(source and destination countries) are included. FE stands for fixed effects with the reported Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which help
controlling for spatial (cross-sectional) dependence. RE (GLS) for random effects generalized least squares estimator (effectively a weighted
average of within and between estimators which are not reported separately), also directional fixed effects (source and destination countries)
are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications include a
constant term.
D Robustness Checks 45
Tab. D.2: Bilateral FDI at Extensive and Intensive Margins with MPK
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D.2 Correlated Chamberlain-Mundlak Panel
Tab. D.3: Correlated Mundlak Chamberlain Panel for Extensive and Intensive Margins
Variables
Correlated RE Mundlak
Chamberlain Panel
LIC MIC Overall
Intensive Margin of Log FDI
Log Destination Income -0.714 -0.400 -0.385
(2.47) (0.572) (0.517)
Log Source Income 0.147 4.391*** 3.874***
(2.604) (0.694) (0.613)
Log Lending Rate -7.018 0.224 0.308
(4.587) (0.533) (0.397)
Log Labor productivity 4.083 1.448** 1.724***
(3.192) (0.705) (0.654)
Extensive Margin of FDI
Log Startup Costs -0.188** 0.0613 -0.0281
(0.0854) -0.0659 -0.0493
Log Lending Rate 0.1506 -0.0611 -0.0465
(0.2205) (0.101) (0.093)
Log Labor productivity 0.893 1.040*** 0.888***
(0.55) (0.273) (0.238)
σˆ (σˆu/ σˆε)
ρˆ
Observations 225
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010 Mundlak-Chamberlain method in-
cludes time averages of relevant explanatory variables and inverse
Mills ratios from the first stage Probit regressions. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term and
directional fixed effects (source and destination countries).
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D.3 Copula Function and MPK
Fig. D.1: Copula-based capital flows models
LIC MIC Overall Sample
Variables Copula
Intensive Margin of FDI
Log Destination Income 0.0254 0.599*** 0.652***
(0.158) (0.0535) (0.0477)
Log Source Income 0.348*** 0.558*** 0.571***
(0.0992) (0.0486) (0.0462)
Log MPK 0.0191 0.802*** -0.394*
(0.308) (0.276) (0.239)
Log Labor productivity -0.0952 -0.276*** -0.0772
(0.148) (0.0802) (0.130)
Extensive Margin of FDI
Log Startup Costs -0.119*** -0.115*** -0.109***
(0.0432) (0.0241) (0.0248)
Log MPK -0.0472 -0.00176 0.134*
(0.0896) (0.0855) (0.0687)
Log Labor productivity -0.0417 0.117*** 0.156***
(0.0378) (0.0238) (0.0395)
Log σ -0.206*** 1.192*** 1.203***
(0.0650) (0.0377) (0.0424)
θ -0.0198 -2.020*** -1.605***
(0.0291) (0.0909) (0.0952)
Note: time coverage is 2002-2010. θ refers to the dependence parameter
in the copula framework. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications
include a constant term.
